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


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
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LIFE OF SOCRATES.



LIFE OF SOCRATES

DR. G. WIGGERS

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

WITH NOTES



LONDON

TAYLOR AND WALTON UPPER GOWER STREET BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS TO UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

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PREFACE.


THE following pages are a translation of part of a work by Dr. Wiggers, formerly of Rostock, entitled "Sokrates, als Mensch, als Bürger, und als Philosoph," a second edition of which was published at Neustrelitz in 1811. This work, which is little known to the scholars of this country, appears to the Editor of the following pages to contain the best account, which has been hitherto given, of the life and character of Socrates. None of the more modern and more celebrated works, which have been published upon this subject in Germany, contain a full account of the life of Socrates, and most of them are distinguished by such fanciful opinions and such extraordinary hypotheses, that it has been thought that the work of Wiggers would be better calculated than any other to convey a correct idea of the leading outlines of the life and character of the great Grecian philosopher. In order to make the work as complete as possible, the Editor has added extracts from the works of more modern writers, and has in some cases given his own opinion upon those points in which Wiggers appeared to him to have taken an erroneous view of the subject. The life of Socrates is undoubtedly one of the most difficult, and at the same time one of the most interesting, subjects connected with the history of ancient philosophy, and in the absence of any better work, it is hoped that the following pages will not be unacceptable to English scholars.

As the opinions of Wiggers on the character and nature of the philosophy of Socrates differ materially from those of Schleiermacher, Brandis, and Ritter, it has been thought advisable to give an Essay of Schleiermacher "On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher," which was translated by the Rev. Connop Thirlwall, and originally published in the Philological Museum, from which it has been reprinted in the present work, with his permission.

London, April 2nd, 1840.

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LIFE OF SOCRATES.

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LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of considerable merit, and of Phaenarete, a midwife, who is called by Socrates, in the Theaetetes of Plato, a very noble-minded woman. He was born at Athens, on the 5th of the month of Thargelion, about the middle of April or May, in the year 469. B. c. (Ol. 77. 4.);1 and belonged to the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece. His features, and indeed his appearance altogether, were anything but handsome, and seemed well adapted for the ironical character which he maintained. Alcibiades, in Plato's Symposium,2 compares him to the Sileni and to Marsyas, the Satyr: "And I may also compare Socrates to the Satyr Marsyas. As for thy appearance, thou canst not deny it thyself, Socrates; to what other things thou art like, thou shalt quickly hear. Thou art a scoffer, art thou not? If thou dost not

¹ [More probably in B. c. 468. See Clinton's "Fasti Hellenici," Vol. II. *Introduction*, p. xx.—Editor.]

² Page 215. ed. Steph.

willingly own it, I will bring forward witnesses." One of the principal passages of the ancients, which bear on this point, is in Xenophon's Symposium, in which Socrates engages in a playful dispute with Critobulus as to which of them is the handsomer. Socrates there tries to prove that his prominent eyes, his depressed nose, and his large mouth must, on account of their greater usefulness, be the handsomer. Several other particulars, which however may be exaggerated, for the purpose of indicating the ugliness of Socrates, are mentioned in the same Symposium.²

Notwithstanding the limited means of his father,³ Socrates was educated according to the manner of the times. Music in the Greek sense of the word, *i.e.* music and poetry, and gymnastic exercises formed the principal part of the education of an Athenian youth; and in these Socrates was instructed.⁴ In addition to which he received instruction in the art of his father; and if we may credit the report of Pausanias, who says that the three Graces made by Socrates had found a place on the walls of the Acropolis of Athens, close behind the Minerva of Phidias, he must have made considerable progress in the art.⁵

¹ V. § 5.

² "Η τόδε γελᾶτε, says Socrates, chap. II. § 19, εί μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων, μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν;

³ That his father was by no means a wealthy man is evident, from the fact that Socrates, though very economical, was always poor.

⁴ Plat. Crito, c. XII.

⁵ Paus. I. 22, and IX. 35. Compare Diog. II. § 19. and the

Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who subsequently became an intimate friend and disciple of our philosopher, having discovered the eminent talents of Socrates, induced him to give up the profession of his father. Various anecdotes preserved in Plutarch and Porphyry rest on too feeble historical evidence to throw any light on the history of Socrates. To this class belongs probably the following story in Porphyry, who being attached to the new Platonic system which formed such a contrast to the sobriety of the Attic sage, was an adversary of the latter. Socrates, we are told by him, was in his youth compelled by his father to follow the art of a sculptor against his inclination, was very disobedient, and often withdrew himself from the paternal

scholiast to the Clouds of Aristoph. p. 170. Timon, therefore, in Diogenes calls him with a sneer of contempt λιθοξόος.

- Diog. II. 20. "Demetrius of Byzantium says that Crito, attracted by the charms of his mind, withdrew him from the workshop and instructed him." Suidas, Tom. II. under Crito, p. 377. I do not think that there is any reason for disbelieving this account. Meiners, indeed, (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, &c. Vol. II. p. 354.) considers this to be a mere calumny of Aristoxenus; but it is Demetrius and not Aristoxenus, who is mentioned by Diogenes as his authority.
- ² His charges against Socrates he derived from Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle. Aristoxenus himself could not deny that Socrates had been obedient to the laws, and had always been just, yet he accuses our philosopher of being guilty of violent anger and shameful dissoluteness. The most unobjectionable evidence of the most credible contemporaries sufficiently refutes such calumnies. A detailed examination and refutation of the charges of Aristoxenus will be found in Luzac's Lectt. Att. edited by Sluiter, Leyden 1809. p. 27. foll. But why Aristoxenus brought these charges against Socrates, will be seen from our subsequent description of the character of the latter.

roof. In the same manner Plutarch, among other things, relates, that the father of Socrates had been warned not to compel his son to follow any particular pursuit, as he had a guardian spirit who would lead him in the right way.

Thus Crito was the first who raised Socrates into a higher sphere. Whether he had before this time enjoyed the instructions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, cannot be decided by historical evidence, although it is asserted by Porphyry that he was a disciple of Archelaus as early as his seventeenth year. The first study that engaged the attention of Socrates, and to which he applied with great zeal, was that of physics. "When I was young," says he in Plato's Phaedo,2 "I had an astonishing longing for that kind of knowledge which they call physics." He sought after wisdom where his fellow-citizens sought it; — in the schools of the vaunting sophists, and of the most celebrated philosophers of his age, as well as in the writings and songs of former sages. Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxa--goras and Archelaus among the philosophers, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus and others among the sophists, are recorded as his teachers.3

¹ De genio Socratis. Francfort, Ed. 1620. Tom. II. p. 889.

² Page 96. A.

³ Zeno of Elea, about the year 460. B. c., at the age of about 40, undertook with his teacher Parmenides, a journey to Athens, for the purpose of meeting Socrates. Whether Socrates ever heard Anaxagoras himself, or only studied his writings, cannot be asserted with historical certainty. That he heard Archelaus is attested by Cicero, Tuscul. V. 10. Evenus of Paros instructed Socrates in poesy. Compare Fischer's remark on the 5th chap-

Assisted by these masters he made considerable progress in mathematics, physics, and astronomy; the value of which he afterwards confined to very narrow limits. Some of his opinions in natural philosophy, which Aristophanes distorts to suit his purpose, must perhaps be referred to this early period of his life. In the instance in which the comic poet² makes him say, that the sky is a furnace, and men the coals in it, the real assertion probably was, that the sky was a vault covering the earth — quite in accordance with the spirit of the cosmological systems of the time; and that he had studied the cosmological system of Anaxagoras with particular attention, is evident; for he himself tells us, that he hoped to find in it information concerning the origin of things. As Socrates himself gives us

ter of Plato's Apology. He had also read the writings of Heraclitus. "What I did understand, was excellent; I believe also that to be excellent which I did not understand." Diog. Laert. II. 22. Plato, Cratylus, p. 402. A. foll. Prodicus taught him the art of speaking. Plat. Meno, p. 96. D. Aeschines III. C.: καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἃ λέγω Προδίκου ἐστὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀπηχήματα (reminiscences). A long register of teachers of Socrates which, however, must not be taken strictly, occurs in Maxim. Tyr. Diss. XXII. [It would appear, however, from a statement in Xenophon's Symposium, that Socrates never received any direct instruction in philosophy; since Socrates is introduced as saying to Callias, who was a great friend and patron of the sophists, ἀεὶ σὺ ἐπισκώπτεις ήμᾶς καταφρονῶν, ὅτι σὰ μὲν Πρωταγόρα τε πολὰ ἀργύριον δέδωκας έπὶ σοφία και Γοργία και Προδίκω και άλλοις πολλοῖς, ήμας δ' όρας αὐτουργούς τινας της φιλοσοφίας ὄντας. Symp. I. 5 — Ep.]

¹ Xenoph. Mem. IV. 7.

² Clouds, v. 94.

³ Plat. Phaedo, p. 97. B. foll.

in this passage an explanation of the reasons, which afterwards induced him to think so little of this system, he shall speak for himself. "I once heard a person reading in a book which he said was written by Anaxagoras, and saying that reason arranged all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct, that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing in the place where it is best. Now if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers or acts best. For this reason I thought only that investigation the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he who succeeded in this, must at the same time know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it, and whichever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee the earth is in the centre, he will at the same time show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped

soon to receive information about the sun, the moon, and other stars, pointing out the mutual relation of their rapidity,-their rotation and other changes; and how it was better that each should act as it acts, and suffer as it suffers. For as he said that they were arranged by reason, I did not think that he would assign any other cause to things than that their actual qualities were the As he assigned to all things their causes, and ascertained them in all things in the same manner, I thought he would represent that which is the best for each, as the good common to all. I would not have given up my hopes for any thing; with great avidity I took up his books, and read them as soon as I found it possible, in order that I might quickly learn the good and the bad. But, my friend, I was soon disappointed in this hope; for in the progress of my reading, I discovered that the man no longer applied his principle of reason, and mentioned no causes by which to classify - things; but declared air, ether, water, and many other strange things to be causes. This appeared to me just as absurd, as if somebody should say, Socrates does every thing which he does, with reason; and afterwards endeavouring to point out the motive of every single action, he should say in the first place that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and of sinews,2 &c. I should have liked very much to have

¹ He is speaking to Cebes.

² $N \in \tilde{v} \rho \alpha$ with Plato does not mean *nerves*, which signification it only received through Galenus.

obtained some instruction, from whomsoever it might have proceeded, concerning the nature of this cause. But as I did not succeed, and as I was unable to find it out by myself, or to learn it from any one else, I set out on a second voyage in search of the cause." The rest are Plato's own thoughts.

Besides this, Socrates was greatly attracted by the intercourse of women of talent, and courted their society for the higher cultivation of his own mind and heart. He, like that powerful demagogue on whom his contemporaries bestowed the highest admiration for the power of his eloquence, was instructed in the art of speaking by Aspasia; and Diotima of Mantinea taught

¹ Plat. Menex. p. 235. E. She is also said to have written a poem to Socrates. Athen. V. p. 219.

It is doubtful whether any historical weight can be attached to the passage in the Menexemus. The whole may probably be looked upon as a fiction; although it can hardly be supposed according to Ast, that Plato meant to deride Pericles and Aspasia. Plato's real object appears to be to ridicule those demagogues, who think themselves equal to Pericles, although they cannot compose a speech for themselves, and are obliged to learn by heart such as have been composed for them by others. All the other passages of the antients, in which Socrates is said to have learnt the art of speaking from Aspasia, are probably taken from this passage of the Menexemus, and therefore prove nothing. Reiske, on Xenophon's Memorabilia, II. 6. § 36, likewise considers the statement in the Menexemus to be made ironically; in which opinion he is supported by Stallbaum and Loers, the late editor of the Menexemus. As for the influence Diotima is said to have had over Socrates, it seems just as uncertain. only mentioned by Plato, and those who copied from him, and is probably of the same nature as the story about Aspasia.— Ep.]

him love; by which as Fr. Schlegel justly observes, we must not understand transient pleasures, but the pure kindness of an accomplished mind; a circumstance which is of importance in forming a proper estimate of many peculiarities in the doctrine and method of Socrates.

¹ Plat. Sympos. p. 201. D. That Diotima is not to be ranked among the ἐταίραι, has been shown by Fr. Schlegel Griechen und Römer.

² Griechen und Römer, p. 254.

CHAPTER II.

Socrates, however, was unable to obtain any satisfactory knowledge from the philosophers and teachers of his time. Dissatisfied with the pretended wisdom of the cosmologists and sophists, he entirely abandoned all speculative subjects, and devoted his attention to human affairs, according to his own expression, in the reference in practical philosophy. He, therefore, in

Diog. II. 21. "When he saw that the science of physics $(\phi \nu \sigma \iota \kappa \dot{\eta} \theta \epsilon \omega \rho \iota \alpha)$ was not adapted for us, he began to philosophize on moral subjects in the workshops and in the markets, and said he was seeking

"Οττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.' The latter is a verse of Homer (Od. IV. 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus contra Mathemat. VII. 21., Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

² 'Aνθρώπεια, res humanæ, are here opposed to δαιμονίοις, rebus divinis (Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 12 and 16), which he also calls οὐράνια (Mem. IV. 7. 6.) 'Ανθρώπεια are things which directly relate to man as such, as questions on the destination of man, his duties, hopes, and in short all moral subjects; δαιμόνια, res divinæ, are of a speculative nature, and comprehend either physical or metaphysical questions, and have no direct relation to man as such. This distinction must be well borne in mind, as otherwise many assertions of Socrates might appear very paradoxical. Cicero Acad. I. 15.—" ut—cœlestia vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene (morally) vivendum conferre."

Plato, calls his wisdom a human wisdom. Socrates, according to Cicero's expression, 2 called philosophy down from heaven to the earth, i. e. he gave it a practical tendency, whereas before, it had taken a direction completely speculative. Previous to Socrates, philosophers were for the most part occupied in cosmological researches: morals were entirely uncultivated; and although the Pythagorean institution, a moral and politicoreligious order, had devoted very great care to morals, yet its doctrines had already fallen very much into oblivion; and besides as an order it had a direct influence only on its own members. But the greatest shock that morality had received, came from the sophists, a class of men who flourished shortly before and at the time of Socrates, and who boasted of being in the possession of every kind of knowledge; but were, however, not concerned about truth, but merely about the appearance of it, who by their eloquence knew how to give to a bad cause the appearance of a good one,3 and from a love of money gave instruction to every one in this art.4

^{1 &#}x27;Aνθρωπίνη σοφία comprehends either the wisdom of which men are in the possession; or the wisdom relating to human affairs, such as the destination, duties, relations, &c., of man. In the former sense it is used in Plat. Apol. c. v., where Socrates says: "It appears that the god means to say by the oracle, that human wisdom is of little or no value at all." In the latter sense Socrates ascribes human wisdom to himself.

² Tuscul. v. 10. Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quærere.

³ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιείν.

⁴ It is well known that the word $\sigma \circ \phi \circ \sigma \tau \dot{\eta} \varsigma$ at first had an honourable meaning, and was synonymous with $\sigma \circ \phi \circ \varsigma$, a sage, a

These men, descendants of the Eleatic school, exerted their utmost power to shake the foundations of knowledge, to unsettle the ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, to confound the moral power of judgment by

scholar in its widest sense—for even artists were comprehended in it. Protagoras was the first who adopted the name of σοφιστής to distinguish more decidedly one who makes others wise, especially one who taught eloquence, the art of governing, politics, or in short any kind of practical knowledge. From that time the word sophist acquired that odious meaning which it retains in the present day. Afterwards in the times of the Roman emperors, the name of sophist again became an honourable appellation, and was applied to those rhetoricians who had established schools of rhetoric, in which they treated on any chosen subject for the sake of exercise. Libanius, for instance, belonged to this class of sophists. Though the latter class in a certain point of view differed from the former, yet covetousness was common to both. Themistius, because he received no money, protested against his being called a sophist (Orat. 23.). The description of a Greek sophist of the time of Socrates is taken from the Protagoras of Plato. In reading, however, the writings of the philosophers of the Socratic school, it must not be forgotten that they had imbibed from their master a profound hatred of the sophists, and may consequently have now and then been rather too severe in their remarks upon them. With the description given above, all Greek writers agree, and the sophists themselves by their own actions sufficiently characterize themselves as such. Speusippus Defin. ad calcem Opp. Plat: Σοφιστής νέων πλουσίων ἐνδόξων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής. Arist. de Sophist. Elench. I. 11. Xenoph. Mem. I. 6. 13.: Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡςαύτως τοὺς μὲν άργυρίου τῷ βουλομένω πωλοῦντας, σοφιστάς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. Isocrat. in Hellen. Encom. II. 116 and 117. Later writers, as Philostratus do not draw any precise distinction between sophists, philosophers, and orators. Philostratus thus mentions Carneades among the sophists. Moreover, not only Socrates but Anaxagoras are called sophists by Libanius (Apolog. Socr. p. 54 and 55, edit. Reiske), perhaps in order to raise thereby his own dignity. Compare Carus's graphic description of the sophists in his Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 493. foll.

dialectical illusions, and to declare a thing to be right at one time, and wrong at another, as their interest dictated. Instead of being teachers of wisdom, they were mere dialectic quibblers, who made no man wiser or better, and who by the spirit of quibbling, which they diffused among their disciples by such questions, as whether virtue could be taught, &c., paralyzed the power of the moral feelings. Socrates discovered the irretrievable injuries inflicted by these people on intellectual advancement and morality, and witnessed the distressing results of it among his contemporaries. Filled with vain pride, the disciples of the sophists returned from their schools, persuading themselves they had discovered the most recondite truths; they thought themselves unequalled in the art of disputing, and were constantly seeking opportunities of displaying their subtleties. Thus they wandered far from the only path of true wisdom, the knowledge of themselves. But the instructions of the sophists were still more injurious, since by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined. Socrates, therefore, firmly resolved to devote his life to the moral improvement of his fellow-citizens, and at the age of about thirty,1 he made it his sacred duty to counteract the sophists, who perplexed good sense, corrupted public

It is indeed generally believed that the public teaching of Socrates commenced precisely at his thirtieth year. But I do not believe that any passage of the antients can be pointed out in support of this belief. However, that Socrates, even when a young man, had chosen the office of a general teacher,

morality, and brought down upon philosophy the reputation of being the art of disputing, nay of being dangerous and injurious. He endeavoured to exhibit them in their naked deformity, and thus directly as well as indirectly, by the doctrines and example of solid virtue, to contribute as much as lay in his power to the moral improvement of mankind.

This noble resolution he faithfully maintained throughout his life, until in his seventieth year he met his

has been proved with great sagacity from several historical facts by Meiners in his Geschichte der Wissenschaften &c. II. p. 353.

[Ritter, however, remarks in his History of Antient Philosophy (Vol. II. p. 20. Engl. Trans.), that "from the constitution of the mind of Socrates, which proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only at a late period have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the study of philosophy. the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception de-There are other reasons also, which picted as an old man. scarcely admit of a supposition that he devoted himself suddenly and all at once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Chærephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose, that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society." In a note on this passage, Ritter observes, "The assumption of Wiggers that Socrates commenced teaching in his thirtieth year is wholly unfounded. That of Delbrück (Socrates § 34), that he had openly philosophized five or six years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (B. C. 423), which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable; although the anecdote of Eucleides, (Gell., Noct. Att. VI. 10.) is apparently inconsistent with it."—ED.]

higher destination in the manner so generally known. Moreover, Socrates during his pursuit of the high objects of his existence, followed a course in which he sought within himself what other philosopers had been accustomed to seek without, and thus directed attention to the operations of the mind. The cause of his pursuing this mode of thought not only arose from his practical mode of thinking, and from the high cultivation of the reasoning powers attained by the exertions of previous thinkers; but also from external circumstances. inscription on the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," and the celebrated declaration of the Delphic god: "Sophocles is wise, Euripides is wiser, but the wisest of all men is Socrates," may have greatly contributed to direct the attention of Socrates to the internal operations of his mind.

The above inscription on the temple of Delphi must have made a very peculiar impression upon him, for he certainly was the first to whom it became a truth of great moral importance. The inscription itself is well known, and needs no further explanation. But as regards the declaration of the Delphic oracle, it is not so easily to be accounted for.

Socrates relates the whole event in the Apology of Plato;² where he says that an intimate friend of his of the name of Chærephon, ventured to ask the Delphic oracle, if there was any one wiser than him (Socrates),

¹ Σοφός Σοφοκλής, σοφώτερος δὲ Εὐριπίδης, ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. Suidas, see σοφός. ² c. v.



and that the Pythia replied, that there was none wiser.

It is, indeed, surprising that Chærephon, a friend and disciple of our philospher, who besides is described both by him and by Plato in the Charmides¹ as a violent and passionate man, should have received this answer to his Plessing,2 therefore, ventures the bold conjecture, that Socrates himself had contributed to this imposition, in order thereby to gain authority, and to prepare his plan for changing the form of government in Athens: for this was, according to him, the end for which Socrates was constantly and deliberately striving. This hypothesis, however, is too derogatory to the character of Socrates to be admitted without further reasons. The passionate nature of Chærephon renders it more probable that he was guilty of an untimely and extravagant zeal to raise the fame of his master. But on the other hand, it is also possible, that Socrates, even at that time had acquired so great a reputation, that his favour was no longer a matter of indifference to the crafty Pythia.

This declaration of the god of Delphi, together with the application which Socrates made of it, is unquestionably the most important fact in the history of his life, as it gives us a clew to his whole subsequent conduct and mode of thinking. From this time Socrates considered himself as a messenger peculiarly favoured by the Deity, standing under its immediate guidance, and

¹ p. 153. B.

² In his Osiris und Sokrates, p. 186, foll.

Apology of Plato, to instruct and improve them. 1 "But that I was sent," says he,2 "as a divine messenger to the state, you may see from what I will tell you. Assuredly it is not a human feature in me that I have neglected all my own interests, and for a great number of years, have not concerned myself about my domestic

1 [Delbrück, in his Sokrates laments that there should be many even among the admirers of Socrates in the present day, who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr. D. thinks, might Thomas à Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility, when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was in the best sense of the word a mystic; and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and proceedings of Christendom. But Mr. Thirlwall remarks in the sixth number of the "Philological Museum" (p. 587), from which the preceding quotations from Delbrück's work have been taken, "that it may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labours. But that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delphic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable, though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere Pagan can believe it to have been more) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his self-devotion, by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary, result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition."—ED.]

² Plato, Apolog. c. xviii.

affairs, and am only anxious for your welfare, going to every one of you and admonishing you, like a father or elder brother, to follow the path of virtue." The same oracle had, perhaps, some influence on his belief in a dæmon, which restrained him in doubtful cases; of the existence of which, he himself, as well as his friends, were firmly convinced, and whose nature we shall now proceed to examine more closely.

¹ Compare Plat. Alcib. II. and de Re publ. VI.

CHAPTER III.

THE dæmon of Socrates has at all times caused great trouble to the commentators; at which we cannot be astonished, since even the friends and disciples of Socrates were ignorant of its real nature. Timarchus, having consulted the oracle of Trophonius about it, received no satisfactory answer. Simmias asked Socrates about the nature of his dæmon, but received no answer at all; perhaps because Socrates himself thought it something quite incomprehensible. From that time he did not propose any other question on this subject. The explanations of the more antient commentators are almost all of a supernatural kind. The greater number of the ecclesiastical fathers declared it to be the devil; Andrew Dacier, to be a guardian angel. It has also been attempted to explain this mental phenomenon in a

¹ Plutarch de Dæmonio Socratis, p. 583. Carus observes very much to the point (Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 236): "There are many things of which Socrates would not form any clear idea, such as dreams; others of which he could not, such as his dæmon."

² Tertullian de anima, I. Aiunt Dæmonium illi a puero adhæsisse, pessimum ve vera pædagogum.

³ In the preface to his French translation of some dialogues of Plato.

natural way; and can it be wondered at, if the results were mere absurdities? Such an hypothesis is preserved by Plutarch in his essay on the dæmon of Socrates, in which it is said to have been a mere divination from sneezing; an hypothesis which even in modern times has found an advocate in M. Morin.¹ Socrates himself certainly did not understand by it a mere prudence acquired by experience, as has been asserted by others, for the very name of dæmon, which, according to the definition of Aristotle,2 means either the Deity itself, or a work of the Deity, suggests to us something beyond the sphere of common experience. To suppose with Plessing,3 that the dæmon of Socrates was a fiction, which would enable him, by the high opinion he would thereby acquire, to realise his plan of changing the form of government in Athens, is an hypothesis which rests on too arbitrary grounds, and is too contrary to the veracious character of Socrates, ever to be adopted by any intelligent scholar.

But notwithstanding these opposite modes of explanation, it may not be so very difficult to arrive at a just view of the genius of Socrates by an historico-psychological mode of enquiry. It was perhaps nothing more than a strong presentiment, which being directed by an accurate knowledge of things, led him to form his

¹ In the Mémoires de litterature tirés des Registres de l'Académie Royale des inscriptions et des belles lettres, Tome IV. p. 333. à Paris 1723.

² Rhetor. II. 23. η θεός η θεοῦ ἔργον.

³ Osiris und Sokrates, p. 185. foll.

conclusions from cause to effect by analogy, without his being perfectly conscious of the process. Such an exalted feeling of presentiment is often found in persons of a lively imagination and refined organization; and that Socrates belonged to this class will be seen hereafter. But Socrates himself actually considered it as an inward; divine voice that restrained him from engaging in unpropitious undertakings. This hypothesis seems to be fully confirmed, not only by the universal belief of antient Greece and Rome in guardian-spirits, who attended men from their birth, but also by the manner in which Socrates himself speaks of this dæmon, and by the examples which are recorded of its influence. principal passages which refer to this dæmon are in the Theages 1 and Apology 2 of Plato, and in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.3 Plato and Xenophon seem to

¹ In the Theages he says: Έστι γάρ τι θεία μοίρα παρεπόμενον εποὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, δ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. p. 128. D. Compare Cicero de Divinat. I. 54. Ast indeed (in the Journ. Philol. by Hauff, Stuttgard, 1803. p. 260.) asserts that the Theages is spurious, but,— even if we could admit this,— we must yet confess that, considering the agreement with the other passages of Plato, Platonic thoughts, at least, constitute its basis.

² In the Apology he speaks almost in the same manner: Εμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. c. xix. Compare Plat. Phædr. p. 242. B.

³ Σωκράτης, says Xenophon, ώς περ έγίγνωσκεν, δύτως έλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, σημαίνειν, καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε, τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου

contradict each other on this point; for Plato states that the dæmon only used to restrain him, but Xenophon represents the genius as disclosing to him the future in general, what should not be done as well as what should But both statements, though apparently contradictory, can, as Charpentier¹ and Tennemann² observe, be very well reconciled. For Plato only expresses himself more decidedly in saying that the voice had only restrained, and never impelled him. Actions from which he was not restrained, were lawful to him, and unattended with danger. In the Apology of Plato³ he concludes from the silence of the voice during the latter period of his life, that whatever then happened to him, was for his good. But Xenophon does not draw a precise distinction between that which the voice directly commanded, and that which Socrates concluded from its silence.3

Our view of the nature of the dæmon of Socrates is thus confirmed by the manner in which he himself is represented as expressing himself upon it, both by Xenophon and Plato. But the probability is still προσημαίνοντος. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε. Memorab. I. 1. 4.

¹ La vie de Socrate, p. 104.

² Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. II. p. 33.

² c. xxxi.

^{&#}x27;[Mr. Thirlwall, in the "Philological Museum," No.VI. p. 583, also remarks, "that there is really no inconsistency between the passage in Xenophon, and the assertion in the Apology and in the Phædrus. For it is evident, that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, show what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it." — Ep.]

more increased by the examples which Socrates gives as the fruits of the suggestions of the dæmon. The genius advised him not to take any part in public affairs, and at first did not allow him to enter into any intimate connections with Alcibiades. Socrates, on his flight after the defeat of Delium, was warned by his genius, and in consequence of it, would not take the same way as the others. He also dissuaded his friends from undertaking apparently indifferent actions—Charmides, from visiting the Nemæan games; Timarchus, from retiring from the repast—and he also opposed the expedition to Sicily. All this he could have known, without revelation, in some measure by an accurate knowledge of circumstances, to which, in most cases,

- ¹ Τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. Apolog. C. XIX. He himself adds the reason immediately afterwards: "Because an honest man who zealously resists the multitude and prevents unlawful actions, must by necessity become a victim to his honesty."
- ² Alcib. I. p. 103. E. Here too he adds the reason, because, he said, Alcibiades in his youth would not have listened to his instructions with proper attention, and he therefore should have spoken in vain.
- ³ Cicero de divinat. I. 54. Idem Socrates, cum apud Delium male pugnatum esset, Lachete prætore, fugeretque cum ipso Lachete: ut ventum est in trivium, eadem, qua ceteri, fugere nolebat. Quibus quærentibus, cur non eadem via pergeret, deterreri se a deo dixit, tum quidem ii, qui alia via fugerant, in hostium equitatum inciderunt. This event is more minutely related by the author of the Socratic letters, p. 6 & 7.
- ⁴ This and several other instances are related in the *Theages* of Plato, p. 129 foll. Cicero, *de divinat*. I. 54. observes that a great number of such instances were recorded by Antipater in his books *de divinatione*. Some are also mentioned by Cicero himself.

every-day experience would lead him; and many things, on the other hand, must be attributed to chance. It is not likely that the voice of which Socrates speaks, should have been a mere figurative expression: he was indeed convinced of its reality, which is sufficiently accounted for by his mental organization. This conviction of Socrates was moreover facilitated by the belief of the antients in the direct influence of the Deity on man, and in guardian spirits who accompanied man from his birth; and more especially by his own belief in the close connection between the human race and the Deity, as well as by his ignorance of mental philosophy.

¹ [Schleiermacher, however, argues from a passage in the Memorabilia (I. 1. § 2. 3.) of Xenophon, that Socrates himself could never have considered his δαιμόνιον, in the light of a specific supernatural being. For Xenophon there speaks of it as something resembling in kind the ordinary instruments of divination, as birds, voices, See "Philological Museum," No. 6. p. 582. omens, sacrifices. Ritter, in his "History of Antient Philosophy," (Vol. II. p. 37— 39.) observes, "We shall not perhaps be far wrong, if we explain the demonium of Socrates as nothing more than excitability of feeling, expressing itself as a faculty of presentiment. It must not, however, be supposed that we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demoniacal intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events, his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition, his disposition to pay attention to dreams, and lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the Gods of House and State. Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished; that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally

It thus appears that the dæmon of Socrates merely related to things the consequence of which was uncertain; but whenever the morality of an action was discussed, Socrates never referred to his dæmon. He was perfectly convinced that in order to know what is

superstitious, but venial, if not commendable. For, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demoniacal intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstitions, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavours of virtuous men, and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience. Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Euthydemus, to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idly and without a cause that he himself spoke of demoniacal intimations. By this Socrates evidently gave him to understand that this demoniacal sign would be manifest to every pious soul, who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of huan reason."—ED.]

Among all the instances mentioned in the Theages of Plato, there is not one in which the rectitude of an action was decided by the dæmon. Hence many authors, such as Buhle, go too far, when they extend the influence of the dæmon to moral feeling. Respecting things imposed upon us as duties, according to the opinion of Socrates, oracles ought not to be consulted.²

But it is interesting to see how this conviction of a genius acted on Socrates, and how, together with the external causes above mentioned, it led him to a careful observation of his own mind. On every occasion he listened to the voice of his genius. Whenever a person desirous of improvement wished to have his instructions, Socrates ascertained whether his genius would not dissuade him; and whenever he was requested to do something which was not at variance with morality, his genius was consulted. It will be needless to explain how

Plutarch de genio Socratis, Tom. III. p. 482. says, the dæmon of Socrates only enlightened him on obscure subjects into which human prudence could not penetrate. But it is surprising that Socrates did not make use of this genius in all doubtful cases. When Xenophon had received letters from his friend Proxenus, persuading him to go into Asia, and to enter into the service of Cyrus the younger, he communicated them to Socrates, and asked for his advice. Socrates referred him to the oracle of Delphi. See Xenoph. Anab. III. 1. 5. Cicero, de divinat. I. 54. says: Xenophonti consulenti, sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quæ sibi videbantur, Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humanum est consilium: sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Anallinem censeo referendum, ad quem etiam Athenienses pul majoribus rebus semper retulerunt.

² Epictetus, Enchiridion, p. 118. edit. Jacobi.

greatly such a disposition must have contributed to turn the inquiries of Socrates from the speculative questions which had engaged previous philosophers, such as the origin and formation of the world, the unity of the first cause and the variety of its operations, in short,—from divine to human affairs, in the sense of Socrates. 1

¹ Carus, in his Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 524 foll. says: "How much must the belief of being under the immediate influence of a protecting genius, have increased his attention to himself, and to what great resolutions and noble self-confidence must it have led him, at that age in which simplicity of heart is still the prevailing characteristic! It is just as remarkable, that he was most strongly attracted to those who had observed in themselves a similar guide."

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates never established any particular school; he taught wherever chance led him, and wherever he found men to whom he thought he might be useful by his instructions, or, — to speak the language of Socrates, — wherever his genius did not prevent him: in public walks, in the gymnasia, porticos, markets, &c.1

In the same sense in which Socrates established no school, he had no disciples; hence he asserts in the Apology,² he had taught none; yet a circle of inquisitive men and youths were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. Such were Plato, Xenophon, Aristippus, Cebes, Simmias, Euclides and others; and it was, properly speaking, from his school, i. e. from the instructions which he had occasionally given, that all the distinguished Greek philo-

¹ Plat. Apolog. C. I. Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 10. Libanius, Apolog. Socrat. p. 7. edit. Reiske: τοιοῦτος ῶν καὶ διάγων, ὡς ἔφην, ὡςπερ τις κοινὸς πατὴρ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης κηδεμῶν περιενόστει τὰς παλαίστρας, τὰ γυμνάσια, τὸ λύκειον, τὴν ἀκα-δημίαν, τὴν ἀγορὰν, ὅποι μέλλει ἐντεύξεσθαι κ. τ. λ.

² Apolog. XXI.: Έγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' εγενόμην. Compare Plutarch, An Seni sit gerenda res publ. Tom. II. p. 796.

sophers subsequently proceeded. He gave his instructions gratis, a disinterestedness which formed the most striking contrast to the covetousness of the sophists.¹

Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.²

His method of teaching, however, had something peculiar to himself, which will be more fully developed in the following remarks.

The peculiarity of his method consisted in questions, the nature of which, however, was different according to the persons with whom he conversed.

Whenever Socrates had to deal with sophists, who were puffed up with their pretended wisdom, he used that admirable kind of *irony* which Cicero translates by "dissimulatio," 3—a translation which Quinctilian

¹ Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. § 6 foll. and chap. 6.

² Οὐ γάρ ἐστι, he says to Alcibiades, τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν. viz. εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν. (Plat. Alcib. I. p. 106. B.) — Το Antiphon, the sophist, he says: Ἐάν τι σχῶ ἀγαθὸν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι, παρ' ὧν ἀν ἡγῶμαι ὡφελήσεσθαὶ τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν. Καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οῦς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων, κοινῆ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν, ἐκλεγόμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις ώφέλιμοι γιγνώμεθα. Χenoph. Mem. I. 6. § 14.

³ Academ. II. 5.: Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita quum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Græci εἰρωνείαν vocant. — Quinctil. Institut. Orat. IX. 2., says: Ironia est totius voluntatis fictio apparens magis, quam confessa, ut illing verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus sermonis, et joci, et tota interim causæ confirmatio, tum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur. C. 20. Dum enim vita universa ironiam habere

did not approve of 1— and which is nothing more than the contrast of the half-ridiculing and half-sincere confession of his ignorance with the boastings of those who thought themselves to be wise. In this manner conceited pride was exposed by questions; and the distinguishing characteristic of the ridicule consisted in Socrates pretending that he could not form an opinion in any other manner; and this I conceive to be the principal difference between the Socratic and Platonic irony. That of Socrates, which is described by Xenophon in its purity, has nothing of Plato's bitterness; its playfulness only instructs, but never enrages. A more minute comparison of the conversation of Socrates

videatur; qualis est vita Socratis. Nam ideo dictus est εἴρων, i. e. agens imperitum et admirator aliorum tamquam sapientum. — The later academicians understood this irony of Socrates in a wrong way, and therefore represented him as the founder of their scepticism. Acad. IV. 23. They also endeavoured to imitate the form of the Socratic method of disputing. Tuscul. I. 10. need hardly remind the reader that we are here only speaking of that kind of irony which is peculiar to Socrates. For on other occasions he often employed that kind of ridicule which we usually call irony, and which was peculiar to the Athenians in general, viz. that contrast between the literal meaning of the expression with the thought conveyed by it, by which a meaning is conveyed to the minds of the hearers totally different from the literal sense of the words. Instances of this irony are to be found in the celebrated dialogue with Theodota, and in the conversation with Pericles the younger, on whom Socrates bestows much praise for his talents as a general. "I know very well," replies Pericles to Socrates (Memorab. III. 5. 24), "that thou dost not say this thinking that I am actually striving after this kind of knowledge, but in order to suggest to me that a future general ought to try to acquire all this kind of wisdom."

¹ Institut. Orat. IX. 2.

with Hippias, as it is described both by Plato and Xenophon, at which the latter was present, may serve to show this difference more strikingly.

This Socratic irony was admirably calculated to place such conceited persons as the sophists in their true light. If any one entered into a discussion with them, he was so much overwhelmed with a host of philosophical terms and sophisms, that the point in question was entirely lost sight of. Socrates played the part of an attentive hearer, who was sincerely desirous of comprehending their sublime wisdom, and now and then asked a short question which was apparently quite insignificant, and did not at all belong to the point at issue,2 and which being answered by the sophists with a smile, he imperceptibly went on, and compelled them, at last, after being perplexed in contradictions, to acknowledge their ignorance. Examples of such conversations are found in all the writings of the disciples of Socrates; but here too we must chiefly depend upon Xenophon, the most faithful interpreter of the manner in which Socrates thought and acted. Besides the above-mentioned conversation with Hippias, examples occur in that with Euthydemus,3 and in other places.

But when Socrates met with disciples desirous of improvement, his instructions again were not given in a

¹ Memorab. IV. 4.

² Cicero, de Oratore, III. 16., blames Socrates for having first separated philosophy and eloquence, which however in the sense above described was highly praiseworthy.

³ Memorab. IV. 2.

didactic form; but he applied the same method of asking which is called after him the Socratic method, and which owes to Socrates, if not its origin, at least its cultivation and perfection. He himself called this method the τέχνη μαιευτική (ars obstetricia), and on that account compared himself to his mother Phaenarete, who though not fruitful herself, was yet admirably skilled in bringing to light the children of others. am an accoucheur of the mind," says he, in the Theaetetes of Plato, "just as my mother is an accoucheur of the body." By this comparison Socrates sufficiently characterises the nature of his method. It is nothing else but an analytical development of the undigested materials existing in the minds of his hearers, and as such it is applicable only as far as the materials are already in the possession of the pupil, or previously communicated to him by synthesis. As regards the form, we have an example of this Socratic method of asking in the Meno of Plato; where Plato makes Socrates apply his method in order to prove his own (Plato's) doctrine of ideas. Socrates there asks quite an ignorant boy some geometrical questions, to which the boy gives correct answers. From this, Plato draws the conclusion that the boy could not have answered in that manner, if his soul had not acquired, in a state previous to its being united to its body, a knowledge of the nature of things; but he seems to have overlooked one important fact, that this knowledge had been previously communicated to the lad by Socrates, in the way of synthesis.

This method of asking, which is usually called the

Socratic method in a limited sense of the word, is in its character often similar to irony, but is different in its object and effect. It differs from our catechetical method in as much as it was confined almost exclusively to adult persons, in whom a tolerable share of knowledge might be supposed to exist, so that they not only answered, but also asked, and thus carried on a lively conversation. But what formed its characteristic feature, was its aiming at leading men to knowledge by reflecting upon themselves, and not upon external objects. This line of demarcation must not be overlooked, and it would be rashness to introduce the Socratic method into our elementary schools. 1

Socrates applied this method with great skill,² and in modern times he has justly been considered as the supreme master of it. He accommodated himself to the individual dispositions, and to the peculiar wants, of each of his disciples, and connected his instructions with the most ordinary events of the day. He rather appeared to instruct himself than to pretend to instruct others, rather called forth ideas than communicated them. The questions were clear and concise; however absurd the answers might be, he knew how to make

¹ See Steuber's dissertation: Kann die Katechese über moralisch-religiöse Wahrheiten zu einer freien Unterredung zwischen dem Lehrer und der Katechumenen erhoben werden?—in Löffler's Magazin für Prediger, vol. V. part I. p. 220 foll.

² Cicero, de finib. II. 1. Socrates percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad hæc quæ hi respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. — Hence the invention of dialogues is attributed to Socrates.

them subserve his purposes. In his conversation he commenced with the most undisputed propositions which even a person with any sagacity might understand and comprehend.1 He omitted no intermediate ideas, but went on carefully from one to another. his researches Socrates sometimes appears to have entered too much into detail, 2 we must not forget that by the want of precision in Greek expressions this apparent diffuseness was often necessary. He introduced a great degree of clearness into his conversations; which he accomplished both by his placing a thing in a point of view the best suited to the person to whom he spoke, and by viewing it in all its relations, by returning to it in various ways, by accurately dissecting the simple qualities of an idea, until the truth which Socrates intended to teach, became evident to his disciples, and, as it were, their own. He knew how to interest those who conversed with him and who seemed to have no wish to enter into any further discussion with him - as Alcibiades — by describing their own character, and by appealing to their peculiar wishes and hopes.3

This is the favourable side of the Socratic method; if however we examine it with impartiality, we must acknowledge that his art of asking was not altogether free from sophistry; yet this tinge of it did not constitute him a sophist, as he never substituted one idea for another, or confounded dissimilar ideas. Neither did

¹ Xenoph. Mem. IV. 6. 15. Œcon. 6. § 2 foll.

² As in Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 57; IV. 6. 3., 4, 13 & 23.

³ Plat. Alcib. I. p. 104. E. foll.

Socrates intentionally try to make error victorious over truth,—which is an essential feature in a sophist, — but his confounding heterogeneous ideas often arose from a want of precision in the Greek language. This kind of sophistry is found in the dialogues of Plato; as in the conversation with Thrasymachus, in the first book of the Republic, where the expression $\ddot{a}\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\nu\nu$ $\zeta\bar{\eta}\nu$ gives rise to a sophistical dispute; and in all the passages in which the word $\kappa\alpha\lambda\delta$ s is sometimes interpreted by beautiful and sometimes by good. To these passages it might be objected that Plato made Socrates speak sophistically; but the same arguments are also found in Xenophon; and even in the writings of this most faithful disciple of Socrates, we find that he confounds

¹ [This assertion, if applied to the Greek language in general, will certainly not find many advocates. If, however, the word καλός, which Wiggers especially mentions, is the only instance, few, who are acquainted with the meaning, which this word has in all the writings of Plato, will feel disposed to assent to the assertion in the text. For with what justice can we find fault with the Greek language, because some sophist avails himself of a word, which according to his opinion has two different meanings, while Plato himself certainly does not attribute two distinct meanings to it? According to Plato, nothing is useful which is not good, and nothing is good which is not at the same time useful. to account for the sophistries of Socrates, of which there are indeed several instances, it should be recollected that Socrates was in his youth instructed by sophists, and subsequently came very often in contact with them, and therefore cannot have been entirely free from their influence; every man partakes, more or less, of the character of the age in which he lives. On the other hand, Socrates sometimes used the weapons of the sophists themselves to expose their ignorance. — Ep.]

² As in the Gorgias, p. 462. D.

the ideas of the beautiful and useful, which are both implied in the Greek word καλός; and also the ideas of virtue and happiness, the bene beateque vivere of Cicero, which the Greek expressed by the word εἰπραξία. In this manner he attributed to the expressions of those with whom he conversed, a meaning which was not intended.¹

A second peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching is, that Socrates himself never gives a definition of the subject in dispute, but merely refutes the opinion of the person with whom he converses. Thus he awakened the true philosophical spirit; and by throwing out doubts, stimulated the mind of his hearer to further examination. In the Meno of Plato, Socrates does not, properly speaking, define what virtue is, but only what it is not, and thus merely refutes the definition given by Meno; and the conclusion that it is a $\theta_{\ell}i\alpha$ $\mu o i \rho a$ is rather ironical: ² Meno therefore compares Socrates to a cramp-fish ³ which paralyzes every one that

¹ Xenoph. Mem. III. 8; IV. 2. 26. The Socratic manner of asking questions is, however, a dangerous instrument in the hands of a sophist, as it is so very easy to take words in different senses, and thus to oblige the person who answers to make assertions which but for the application of those sophisms, he would never acknowledge as his own. Protagoras, who perceived this, combined the Socratic method with that of the sophists. Diog. IX. 8. 4.

² I should at least not like to infer with Carus (Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 254.) from this passage that Socrates had looked at virtuous men as inspired by the deity. Besides it would be incompatible with the assertion of Socrates that virtue can be taught.

³ p. 80. A.

comes in contact with it. 1 This mode of disputing (in utramque partem disputare) descended to the school of Plato, 2 and constituted the academica ratio disputandi, 3 though Socrates did not employ it in the sense in which the later academy made use of it. Socrates was far from philosophical scepticism; he was unconcerned about speculation; and the truths of practical philosophy had for him positive evidence.

By this mode of disputing, Socrates acquired a considerable advantage over the sophists; for as he did not openly express his own opinion, they could not lay hold of his views, but were obliged to allow him to attack and to refute their dogmatical assertions. "Thou shalt," says Hippias, the sophist, to Socrates, "not hear my opinion, before thou hast explained to me what thou meanest by the just. For it is enough that thou laughest at others in proposing to them questions and refuting them; but thou never givest any account or answer thyself, nor wishest to express thy opinion on any subject."

As Socrates did not deliver any complete discourse, the form of his philosophical lectures cannot be spoken of, and consequently there are no complicated conclusions, corollaries, &c., which abound in the writings of other philosophers.

¹ Οὐ γὰρ, he says in the same dialogue (p. 80. C), εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν.

² Cicero de Nat. Deor. I. 5.

² Cicero Tuscul. I. 4.

⁴ Xenoph. Mem. IV. 4. § 9.

A third peculiarity of the Socratic method was the inductive mode of reasoning. "Two things," says Aristotle (Metaph. XIII. 4.), "are justly ascribed to Socrates, induction and illustration by general ideas." Cicero 1 also mentioned it as something peculiar to Socrates and Aspasia. Instances of such inductions are most numerous in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.2 Thus he tried to prove by induction, to Chærecrates, who did not live on the most friendly terms with his brother Chærephon, what he ought to do to gain the affections of his brother; 3 to his friend Diodorus that he must support poor Hermogenes; 4 to timid Charmides, who had too great a diffidence in his own talents, that he must endeavour to obtain public appointments. 5

A fourth and last peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching was the palpable and lively manner in which he delivered his instructions, leading his hearers from the abstract to the concrete by similes, allegories, fables, apophthegms, passages from poets, and sayings of wise men. A peculiar talent of Socrates was the power he possessed of demonstrating the correctness or incorrectness of general assertions by applying them to individual cases. It is evident that a distinctness of conception

¹ De Invent. I. 51 foll. Topica. 10.

² 'Οπότε δὲ, says Xenophon (Mem. IV. 6. 15.), αὐτός τι λόγω διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλετα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν είναι λόγου.

³ Xenoph. Mem. II. 3. 11 foll.

⁴ Ibid. II. 10.

⁵ Ibid. III. 7.

must have been promoted by such a popular method of reasoning, especially among a people thinking as practically as the Greeks. It was also best adapted for exposing the absurdity of many assertions of the sophists, who principally delighted in general propositions. If the sophists expressed themselves in dazzling theses and antitheses, Socrates directly applied them to individual cases taken from common life, and thus demonstrated in a palpable manner the inapplicability of their assertions. His similes were taken from the immediate circle of his hearers: a circumstance for which, it is well known, Socrates has often been ridiculed.

A great many passages from the Socratic philosophers might be quoted in proof of the manner in which he rendered abstract ideas palpable; but it will be sufficient here to give the classical passage from the Symposium of Plato, in which Alcibiades, the favourite of Socrates, gives his opinion on the method of teaching pursued by Socrates.¹

¹ p. 221. Ε. Εὶ ἐθέλει τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖεν ἀν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται Σατύρου ἄν τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥςτε ἄπειρος καὶ ανόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἀν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειε. διοιγόμενος δὲ ἰδὼν ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὐρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειστάτους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλματα ἀρετης ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προςήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κάγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι. Α great power in speaking is attributed to him even by his enemies, Aristoxenus

The ironical character of the method of Socrates was principally directed against the sophists, whom he combated very successfully with this weapon: and indeed sharp weapons were necessary to humble these men who undeservedly enjoyed so great an authority among the Greeks. There were however among the sophists some very superior men, who only wanted the true spirit of philosophy, the love of truth and science, in order to accomplish great things. We cannot therefore rank all the sophists in the same class, and must carefully distinguish a Protagoras or a Gorgias, who deserve our sincere respect for their talents, and who were celebrated as orators, and made the first researches into the nature of language, - from a Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, whom Plato, in his Euthydemus, describes as Socrates took the field against these true logomachists. two classes of sophists, and established moral consciousness, founded on common sense, in opposition to their moral scepticism; and notwithstanding their sophistical stratagems, often extorted from them the shameful confession of their own ignorance. His disciples, encouraged by his example, carried the irony of their master against the sophists further than himself. "The sons of the richest people," says Socrates, in Plato's Apology, 1 "who necessarily have the greatest leisure, follow me of their own accord, and are pleased when they hear me refuting these men. Yea, they themselves often follow

and Porphyry. Theodoret. ad Græcos infideles, Serm. IV. p. 56.

¹ C. X.

my example, and undertake to examine others." No wonder that Socrates gained for himself the perfect hatred of these people, and that they left no means untried to effect his ruin. But of this hereafter.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates lived in the simplest manner; and it was from this circumstance that he was enabled to maintain his philosophical independence, notwithstanding his limited means. He despised the luxurious mode of living, which had greatly increased in his time at Athens, as well as all those sensual enjoyments that destroy the health both of body and mind. Yet Socrates did not violate the laws of taste and propriety; but observed a nice distinction, by the neglect of which the Cynics destroyed all that genuine humanity, which rendered Socrates so amiable, notwithstanding the austerity of his manners. 3

of Xenophon (II. § 3.), "if I could find a reasonable purchaser, I should perhaps get five minæ for all my property, including my house."

² Ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως, says Antiphon, the sophist, to Socrates (Xenoph. Mem. I. 6. 2.), ὡς οὐδ' ἀν είς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότη διαιτώμενος μείνειε, σιτία τε σιτῆ, καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἡμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνοπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς.

³ The statement, in the Symposium of Plato, that Socrates bathed but seldom, is to be understood of warm baths, which Socrates considered as tending to make the body effeminate. The

But the exertions which Socrates devoted to the improvement of mankind, did not prevent him from fulfilling those duties which were incumbent on him as a citizen.

Socrates deserved well of the state as a father and a husband. Xanthippe, his wife, is sufficiently known to posterity as a woman of violent passions, and her name has even passed into a proverb. In modern times some scholars, as Heumann and Mendelssohn,1 have endeavoured to defend her, but with little success. That she possessed many good qualities, and not withstanding her passionate character may have had a great deal of goodness of heart, can be easily admitted; but that she was of a very quarrelsome disposition, and made Socrates feel its effects, we may easily believe, without giving credit to the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch, Diogenes, and Ælian, from the manner in which Antisthenes, and even Socrates himself, in a playful manner express themselves concerning her.2 "But," says Antisthenes, "what is the reason, Socrates, that, convinced as thou art of the capacity of the female sex for education, thou dost not educate Xanthippe, for she is the worst woman of all that exist, nay, I believe of all that ever have existed, or ever will exist?" -- "Because," replies he, "I see that those who wish to be-

description of philosophers by Aristophanes (Clouds, v. 833.) does not involve Socrates.

¹ Heumann in the Acta Philosoph. vol. i. p. 103. Mendels-sohn, in his Phædon, p. 23.

² Xenophon Sympos. II. 10.

come best skilled in horsemanship, do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses. For they believe that after being enabled to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now as it was my wish to converse and to live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced that in case I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others." By Xanthippe Socrates had several sons; on the eldest of whom, called Lamprocles, he enjoins, in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 2 obedience to his mother. At his death he left behind him three sons, one of whom was a youth, but the other two were still children. 3

^{1 [}Ritter remarks (History of Philosophy, II. p. 33, 34.) "Socrates was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fall naturally enough far into the back ground; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xanthippe to her husband and child, prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy, he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child, we are justified in ascribing to him, together with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties."—ED.]

² II. 2. 7.

³ Plat. Apolog. c. XXIII. — Whether Socrates, as some think, had also been married to Myrto, cannot be decided with historical certainty. The contrary opinion, however, is far more probable, as appears from Meiner's examination (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. II. p. 522). Even Panætius Rhodius in Athenæus (XIII. init. p. 555.) was of this opinion, which is also adopted by Bently in his Dissertat. de Epistolis Socratis, § 13. Luzac in his discourse de Socrate Cive, p. 7. supposes that Socrates had had two wives, first Myrto, and after her death Xanthippe. He at the

Socrates performed military service in three different battles, of which he gives us an account himself in the Apology of Plato.¹

The first time that Socrates performed military service, was in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth year of his age; at the siege of Potidæa, an Athenian colony in Thrace, in the years 431 and 430 B.C. The inhabitants of Potidæa had revolted from the Athenians, to whom they were tributary, and were supported by the Corinthians; and other Peloponnesians. In this campaign,

same time combats the opinion of those who think that Socrates had been married to two women at once. He assigns a different meaning to the Athenian law which was passed in the time of Pericles, and according to which, as is commonly supposed, it was lawful to contract a double marriage, — a law which the advocates of that opinion usually quote in support of it. The subject is still more minutely discussed by Luzac in the above-mentioned Lectiones Atticæ, especially against Mahne's Diatribe de Aristoxeno.

¹ C. XVII.—Athenæus (Deipnosoph. V. 15) the bitter opponent of philosophers, and more especially of Plato, declares the whole narrative of the military services of Socrates to be a fiction, and observes that philosophers do not always strictly adhere to historical truth. Plato, he says, contradicts himself, since he asserts in the Crito that Socrates had never been out of Athens, except once, and that on a visit to the Isthmian games, and yet in the Apology, and Symposium, he makes Socrates say that he had fought in three battles. But this passage shows how little reliance is to be placed on the remarks of Athenæus, for in the Crito he has overlooked the following words: εί μή ποι στρατευ~ σόμενος. We are acquainted with too many instances of the carelessness of antient grammarians (see Wesseling on Diodorus Siculus, vol. I. p. 527. and Hutchinson on Xenophon's Anabasis, p. 301.) to have recourse to the hypothesis, that these words were omitted in the edition which Athenæus had before him.

Socrates endeavoured to harden his body, and to steel himself against the effects of hunger, thirst, and cold. Though Potidea was besieged during the severest cold of a Thracian winter, Socrates, in his usual clothing, walked bare-foot through snow and ice.1 He distinguished himself so much by his bravery, that the prize was awarded to him, which he, however, gave up to Alcibiades, his favourite follower, (whom he himself had saved in this battle, as we are told by the latter, in the Symposium of Plato2), with the object of encouraging him to deserve from his country such honours in future by his own personal merits. Various anecdotes are preserved respecting this campaign of Socrates; to which, however, we cannot attach any importance. Thus we are told by Gellius, Diogenes, and Ælian, that while the plague raged in the Athenian camp, and in Athens itself, Socrates was the only person who escaped the general infection. It is also said that he once stood for twenty-four hours on the same spot before the camp, absorbed in deep thought, with his eyes fixed on an object, as if his soul were absent from his body.3

In his second campaign we find Socrates at Delium, a town in Bœotia, where the Athenians were defeated by the Bœotians.⁴ This battle was fought 424 B. C., when Socrates was at the age of forty-five, in the same

Diog. II. § 12. Thucyd. I. 58 foll.

² p. 220. D.

³ Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att. II. 1; Diog. II. § 25; Ælian, Nat. Hist. XIII. 27.

⁴ Thucyd. IV. 96.

year in which the Clouds of Aristophanes were performed. Although the issue was unfavourable to the Athenians, Lackes, the Athenian general, whom Socrates afterwards accompanied in his flight, declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as Socrates, the Bœotians would have erected no trophies.²

Soon after this battle, Socrates was engaged in military service for the third time at Amphipolis, a city of Thrace or Macedonia, which was a colony of Athens, and a town of great commercial importance. It had been seized by Brasidas, a Lacedæmonian general, 424 B. c.; and the Athenians with a view to its recovery, sent an army 422 B. c. under Cleon to Thrace, which did not succeed in its undertaking. In this expedition Socrates was present; but we do not find him engaged afterwards in any other military duties, since he was now approaching the fiftieth year of his age.

Socrates was particularly attached to his native city. "I love my countrymen more than thine," he remarks

² I pass over the ridiculous anecdote of Diogenes (II. 23.), who says that Socrates, when all had taken to flight, retreated step by step, and often turned round to oppose any enemy that might attack him. This circumstance is mentioned by no other antient writer. It finds a severe censor in Athenæus, who also doubts the fact that Socrates had given up the prize of bravery to Alcibiades at Potidæa, since Alcibiades had taken no part in that war. The latter circumstance, however, is sufficiently established on the authority of Plato (Sympos. p. 219. E). Simplicius ad Epictet. c. 31. tells us that the Bœotians had been deterred by the bravery of Socrates from pursuing the fugitives. Thus every thing is exaggerated, and often to a monstrous degree, by later writers.

in the Theætetes of Plato to Theodorus, a mathematician of Cyrene, who taught at Athens. 1 This partiality for Athens, which at that time presented a picture of the great world on a small scale, combined with a feeling of independence, were perhaps the principal reasons which determined him not to accept the flattering invitations of Archelaus, Scopas, and Eurylochus.² "He smiled upon three tyrants," says Libanius in his apology,3 "at their presents, their manner of living, and their exquisite pleasures." The riches, and the manner in which the great lived, had no attractions for him; not even the sovereign of Asia was happy in his opinion.4 He did not wish to go to a man, he told Archelaus, who could give more than he himself could return; Athens, he said, four measures of flour were sold for one obolus, the springs yielded plenty of water, and he lived contented with what he possessed.5

Socrates did not like a country-life, for man attracted him more than nature. "Forgive me, my friend," he once said to Phædrus,6 who preferred a country-life,

¹ Compare Plato, Apol. XVII. — These expressions of Socrates seem to raise a doubt as to the statement of Cicero (Tuscul. V. 37.) and Plutarch (de Exilio, vol. VIII. p. 371.), that Socrates had said he was no Athenian, no Greek, but a citizen of the world. Compare Meiners' Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. II. p. 361.

² Diog. II. 25. Aristot. Rhetor. II. 23.

³ p. 58 and 59. edit. Reiske.

⁴ Cic. Tuscul. V. 12.

⁵ Seneca de Benef. V. 6. Epictet. Fragm. 174. edit. Schweighaüser.

⁶ Plat. Phædr. p. 230. D.

and who accused Socrates of being almost unacquainted with the neighbourhood of Athens, "I am very anxious to learn something; and from fields and trees I can learn nothing; but I can indeed from the men in town." Thus we do not read of his being absent from Athens, except on the expeditions mentioned above, and on some short journeys, such as to the Isthmian games and to Delphi; and as some think, on a journey to Samos, with Archelaus his teacher.1

After Socrates returned to Athens from those expeditions, he was regarded by his countrymen and by the Greeks in general, as an eminent teacher and practical philosopher. But his activity as a citizen, was exerted in a still different sphere, for in his sixty-fifth year he became a senator. "I have," says he in the apology of Plato, "held no state-office, men of Athens, with the exception of having been a senator."

In order to understand fully the conduct of Socrates in this office, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the constitution of the Athenian senate. The Athenian senate usually called $\hat{\eta} \beta o \nu \lambda \hat{\eta} \tau \tilde{\omega} \nu \pi \epsilon \nu \tau \alpha \kappa o \sigma i \omega \nu$, consisted of five hundred senators, who were elected from the ten tribes established by Cleisthenes. Every month, viz. every thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth day, (for the Athenian year consisted of ten months), one tribe had the presidency, and this tribe was called $\phi \nu \lambda \hat{\eta} \pi \rho \nu$ -

¹ Plat. Crito, c. XIV. The journey to Samos is mentioned by Diogenes, II. 23, on the authority of Ion of Chios. This, however, contradicts the statement made in the passage of the Crito which Diogenes had shortly before (22.) confirmed.

raνεύουσα; and its members πρυτάνεις. Of these fifty prytanes ten had the presidency every seven days, under the name of πρόεδροι. Each day, one of these ten enjoyed the highest dignity, with the name of ἐπιστάτης. His authority was of the greatest extent: he laid every thing before the assembly of the people, put the question to the vote, examined the votes, and in fact conducted the whole business of the assembly. A senator was only elected for one year; and a man could only be epistates once, and only for one day. He, who was invested with this office, had the keys of the citadel and the treasury of the republic entrusted to his care.

Socrates was epistates² on the day when the unjust sentence was to be passed on the unfortunate admirals, who had neglected to take up the bodies of the dead, after the battle of Arginusæ. How did Socrates behave on that occasion? This is an event which shows Socrates to us, in such an active and indeed important office, that it is of the greatest importance in forming a proper estimate of his character, to observe his conduct on this occasion with the greatest attention.

In the battle off the islands of Arginusæ, (B. c. 404,) the Athenians had obtained a complete victory, under the command of ten admirals, among whom Pericles, an adopted son of the celebrated demagogue of that name, and Diomedon possessed considerable reputation. To take care of the burial of the dead was regarded by

Pollux, VIII. 9.

² Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 18. See Luzac, de Socrate Cive, p. 91 foll.

the Athenian laws, as a sacred duty; since the shades of the unburied dead, said the Greek superstition, restlessly wander a hundred years on the banks of the Styx. But after the battle there arose a violent storm; which prevented the ten generals from obtaining the bodies of the slain; yet in order to effect every thing in their power, they left behind them some inferior officers, ratiopxai, to attend to the burial of the dead. Among these taxiarchs we find Thrasybulus, who expelled the thirty tyrants, and Theramenes who afterwards became so well known as one of these tyrants, and was at last executed. But the violent storm opposed insurmountable obstacles to the execution of their orders.

It then became necessary to give to the senate and the people of Athens, a full report of what had taken place. Although the admirals might have thrown the whole blame on the taxiarchs, yet, chiefly induced by Pericles and Diomedon, they stated in their report, that the storm had prevented them from fulfilling this sacred duty. But Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had arrived at Athens before the ten admirals, brought such heavy charges against them, that six who had already returned, were, at the command of the senate, thrown into the public prison. They were summoned before the tribunal of the people (the Helica), Theramenes and Thrasybulus appearing foremost among their accusers; and were accused of high treason. They proved in their defence, by the evidence of their pilots, that the tempest had rendered it absolutely impracticable for them to fulfil their duty; besides which they had also appointed Thrasybulus and Theramenes as taxiarchs, and therefore, if it were necessary for anybody to suffer punishment, it should be inflicted on them. This statement produced its natural effect on the people; and they would probably have been acquitted at once, if the question had been put to the vote. But by such an act, the design of their enemies would have been frustrated. They therefore managed to adjourn the assembly till another day, alleging that it was too dark to count the show of hands.

In the meanwhile, the enemies of the admirals set all their engines at work, to inflame the people against them. The lamentations and the mournful appearance of the kinsmen of the slain, who had been hired by Thrasybulus and Theramenes for this tragic scene, during the festival of the Apaturia, which happened to fall on the day on which the assembly was held, were intended to inflame the minds of the people against the unfortunate admirals. The votes were to be given on the general question, whether the admirals had done wrong, in not taking up the bodies of those who had been left in the water after the battle; and if they should be condemned by the majority, (so the senate ordained,) they were to be put to death and their property to be confiscated.²

¹ The ' $A\pi\alpha\tau$ ούρια were solemnized for three days. The most probable interpretation of the word is to consider it synonymous with $\delta\mu$ οπατόρια, as the children came with their fathers to register their names in the phratries. See Weiske on Xenoph. Hellen. 1.7.8.

² Xenoph. Mem. I. 1. 18. Hellen. I. 7. 34.: ἡ δὲ τῆς βουλῆς γνώμη ἡν μιᾶ ψήφμαπαντας κρίνειν. In this same passage the

But to condemn all by one vote, was contrary to an ancient law of Cannonus, according to which the vote ought to have been given upon each individual separately. Hence the prytanes, and Socrates at their head, refused to put the illegal question to the votes of the people. Yet, when the latter, enraged against the prytanes, loudly demanded that those who resisted their pleasure, should themselves be brought to trial, they yielded to the general clamour with the exception of Socrates, who alone remained unshaken.

Notwithstanding all the threatenings that were used against him, he could not be induced to desist from his resolution, but boldly declared he would do nothing which he considered contrary to his duty. In consequence of this refusal, the question could not be put to the vote, and the assembly was therefore adjourned; another epistates and other $\pi\rho\delta\epsilon\delta\rho\sigma\epsilon$ were chosen, and the enemies of the admirals obtained what they had wished for. The admirals were condemned to death, and the six, who were in Athens, were executed.

This was the only civil office that Socrates ever held;

antient law of Cannonus is mentioned, which enjoined κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἕκαστον. [On the decree of Cannonus see Appendix II. to the fourth volume of Mr. Thirlwall's "History of Greece."—Ed.]

They were sentenced to death B. c. 404. Luzac, in his Disquisitio de Epistatis et Proedris Atheniensium, p. 114, which is added to his discourse de Socrate Cive, has considered the subject very carefully. The principal passages of the antients are: Xenoph. Hellen. I. 7. and Æsch. Axiochus, c. 12. Though Æschines may not be author of this dialogue, yet the agreement existing between him and Xenophon, proves its authenticity with regard to historical facts.

and we cannot be surprised when so many acts of injustice were committed, which he alone could not possibly have prevented, that he entirely withdrew from public business. He mentions this himself, as the reason of his living a private man. "Be assured, men of Athens, if in former times, I had wished to engage in public affairs, I should have perished long ago, without being either useful to you or myself."

Socrates himself lived to see the injurious consequences, which the unjust condemnation of those admirals brought down upon Greece, in the mournful issue of the Peloponnesian war. The very year after their condemnation, (405. B. c.) the Athenians for want of able generals were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; their fleet was destroyed, Athens besieged, and reduced to the necessity of surrendering at discretion to the victors. Lysander after this established the government of the Thirty Tyrants, whose memory is branded in history; and Socrates was one among the many who had to struggle with their injustice. Freret indeed has endeavoured² to prove that Socrates supported these hateful oligarchs, and that by this circumstance we must account for his condemnation immediately after their fall. But this assertion is at variance with everything recorded, respecting the history and opinions of Socrates. He was indeed favourably disposed towards an aristocratical govern-

¹ Plato, Apolog. c. XIX.

² Magazin Encyclopédique, Seconde Année, Tom. V. p. 474 foll.

ment, but in the old Attic sense of the word, viz. to a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the best and wisest; but he could never have approved of an oligarchy, and least of all of a despotic oligarchy, like that of the Thirty. Socrates loved his fellow-creatures too well to wish them to be ruled by such oppressors.

There can be no blame attached to Socrates, that Critias, one of the Thirty, had been his disciple, for it could not be in the school of Socrates that he had learnt the bad principles on which he acted. He had, as we are told by Xenophon, 1 not sought the instruction of Socrates because he loved him, but like Alcibiades, in order to learn the kingly art—which was the name for politics, or the science of governing men²—in the same manner as every young Athenian anxious to distinguish himself in the state, sought the instructions of some one of the sophists, among whom Socrates was ranked. Critias not finding what he expected, soon afterwards abandoned the company of Socrates; and we also know how he afterwards behaved towards his former master. Socrates never made use of the language of flattery; but censured on every occasion the wicked rulers of a poor and orphan people. This reached the ears of the Thirty. Critias and Charicles, who were appointed to compose a code of laws, forbade, with the intention of injuring Socrates, any instruction to be given in the art of speaking; a profession, however, in which Socrates had never been engaged. But when he continued to converse with

¹ Memorab. I. 2. 39.

² Memorab. IV. 2. 11.

young men, and show them the path of real wisdom, Critias, who moreover entertained an old aversion to Socrates for having censured his sensual pleasures with Euthydemus and Charicles, summoned him before their tribunal, and altogether forbade him from conversing with or instructing young men. Socrates in his usual manner had used a simile, which gave great offence to the Thirty, who felt its truth. "I should indeed wonder," Socrates had said, "if a cow-herd under whose care the cows grow fewer and thinner, would not own that he was a bad cow-herd, but it is still more astonishing to me, if a state-officer who diminishes the number of citizens and renders them unhappy, is not ashamed and will not own, that he is a bad officer of the state." Charicles added the significant words: "By god, pray, do not speak of the cow-herd! take care that thou dost not thyself diminish the flock by speaking again of "Now it was evident," adds Xenophon, "that after the simile of the cows had been reported to them, they were enraged against Socrates."1

Thus Socrates, far from supporting the tyrants, was a declared enemy of these base and cruel men, and none of their edicts had the effect of inducing him to abandon that course which he considered his duty. Entertaining no fear of them, he did not leave Athens, which is duly appreciated by Cicero.² The Thirty summoned him with four others to the Tholos, the place in which the

¹ Memorab. I. 2. 29.

² Ad Attic. VIII. 2: "Socrates, quum triginta tyranni essent, pedem porta non extulit."

prytanes used to take their meals; and commanded him to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens, who had obtained the right of citizenship at Athens, but had chosen a voluntary exile, fearing that the tyrants might execute him, as he was a wealthy and distinguished man.1 "Then indeed," says Socrates in Plato's apology, "I showed by my actions and not merely by my words, that I did not care (if it be not too coarse an expression) one jot for death; but it was an object of the greatest care to me to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government, though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust; but when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have suffered death on account of this, if the government had not soon been broken up."

In this manner Socrates most effectually refused taking any part in the unjust acts of the Thirty,² who were very anxious to gain him over to their interest, as

¹ Τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ ὁτιοῦν κ. τ.λ. c. XX.—Οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν seems to be an expression which only people of the lower classes made use of, hence the addition of Socrates: εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢν εἰπεῖν, " quamvis forte rudior loqui videar." Libanius, the imitator of the Attic idiom, on this account adds before οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν the softening ὡς εἰπεῖν. Apol. p. 8. The courage and intrepidity of Socrates before the Thirty is often mentioned. Seneca Epist. 28: "Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt, nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere.' Diog. II. 24: Ἡν δὲ (Σωκράτης) δημοκρατικός, ὡς δῆλον ἕκ τε τοῦ μὴ εἰξαι τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν κ. τ. λ.

² Plat. Epist. VII. ad Dionis propinquos.

they wished in general to have as many of the citizens as possible accessary to their crimes. When he declared that he would never assist them in any unjust act, Charicles said: "Dost thou indeed wish to be at liberty to say what thou pleasest, and not suffer anything at all for it?" "I am willing to suffer any calamity," said Socrates, "but I will not do wrong to any one." Charicles was silent, and his associates looked at each other.

According to Diodorus, Socrates undertook the defence of Theramenes, a man of a very equivocal character.¹ This account has been copied by other writers, but is not established on sufficient historical evidence being mentioned neither by Plato, by Xenophon, nor any other contemporary writer.²

Theramenes was himself one of the thirty tyrants. When he was sent on an embassy by his fellow-citizens, who had placed great confidence in him, to enter into

¹ Diod. Sic. XIV. 5. Aristotle, Cicero, and Diodorus, speak of Theramenes in the highest terms. Aristotle (in Plutarch, III. p. 337.) and Cicero, who seem to have been prejudiced in his favour by the constancy with which he suffered death, declare him to have been the best citizen of Athens. Cicero (Tuscul. I. 40.) speaks in terms of the highest admiration of his courage during his execution, and ranks him with Socrates; Diodorus (I. p. 640 foll. edit. Wesseling.) describes him as a very superior man. But from the records of history we must consider him as a weak, mean, vain, and selfish person. See Thucyd. VIII. 68 foll.; Lysias (edit. Markland), p. 210 & 215.; and Xenoph. Hellen. II. 2 & 3. We are informed by the latter that he was nick-named Kόθορνος, a word expressive of the fickleness of his character. See Weiske on this passage.

² Among the writers of a later time, the author of the biographies of the ten orators, ascribes the defence of Theramenes to Isocrates, p. 836. F.

negotiations with Lysander, he abused his trust, and was the first who proposed to change the democracy to an oligarchy. He himself named ten of the Thirty; and lived on terms of intimate friendship with Critias, the most cruel of those tyrants. But the characters of these men were too different, to allow their friendship to be of long duration. Critias, a man of energetic character; never lost sight of the object which his imagination represented to him as desirable, and at the same time employed every means in his power which might enable him to gain his ends. Theramenes also wished to distinguish himself, but in the choice of his means, though little concerned about morality, he displayed great anxiety for his personal safety. The violent measures of Critias and his colleagues appeared to him too dangerous, and he proposed to elect a number of citizens, who might take a part in the business of the government and check the cruelties of the Thirty. the Thirty were little disposed, to relinquish the power which they had obtained with difficulty, and had preserved with so much cruelty and bloodshed; and they resolved to rid themselves of one who might prove a powerful enemy to their designs. Critias accordingly accused Societies before the council; and Theramenes defended himself in a manner, which made a very favourable impression on the council; but Critias, seeing that he could not depend upon the assistance of the council, condemned him to death, with the consent of his colleagues, without even putting the question to the vote as to his condemnation or acquittal. Theramenes

flew to the altar of Vesta; and Socrates, Diodorus says, undertook his defence. Supported by two other citizens, he used every exertion to save him, until Theramenes entreated him to desist from an undertaking, which was as dangerous for him, as it was useless to himself. Theramenes after this, drank the poisoned cup with great composure and serenity.

If Socrates actually undertook the defence of Theramenes, it was unquestionably a noble action; as the reason for which the Thirty punished their colleague, and the manner in which it was done, were equally detestable. Plato's silence respecting this occurrence may be accounted for; as in his seventh letter he evidently avoids every opportunity of speaking of Critias, who was his kinsman¹ on his mother's side. But perhaps Plato as well as Xenophon may have considered Theramenes unworthy of the defence of Socrates, and on that account passed over it in silence. However, the works from which Diodorus compiled his history, especially where he does not mention his authorities, are not entitled to so much confidence as to justify us in having recourse to these hypotheses. It seems also contrary to the character of Socrates, that he should have been deterred by the representations of Theramenes, that his exertions would be fruitless and dangerous to himself; for Socrates did not easily desist from a resolution once taken up, as he cared little about personal danger, unless he was restrained by his genius.

¹ Diogenes, III. 2.

CHAPTER VI.

We now come to the most interesting period in the life of Socrates; his accusation, defence, condemnation, and execution. We know that all this took place a few years after the abolition of the oligarchy by Thrasybulus, in the year 400, or according to others, 399 B.C. Anytus, Lycon and Meletus brought the accusation in a writ, (ἀντωμοσία) before the tribunal of the people, charging him with introducing new divinities and corrupting the

¹ That it was the tribunal of the people, or the court of the Heliastæ (ἡλιασταί), or Dicastæ (Δικασταί), by which Socrates was condemned, has been proved by Bougainville, in his essay, "On the priests of Athens," in the Memoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, and by Meiners in his Gesch. d. Wiss. vol. ii. p. 482, against Meursius, who thought that Socrates had been condemned by the Areopagus. This usual supposition is also advocated by Patter and Stollberg in the remarks on the Apology. But Bougainville's arguments for substituting the Heliastæ seem to be convincing. The Heliastæ were elected from the whole body of the people without any regard to the different classes, and received a pay for their services. Their name arose from the circumstance of their assembling immediately after sunrise, and in a sunny place. [This etymology is too absurd to need any refutation. 'Ηλιαία, the name of the place where the 'Ηλιασταί assembled, is another form of άλίη (an assembly), a word which frequently occurs in Herodotus. — It is also connected with άλής, and άλίζομαι. — ED.]

young; Anytus, on behalf of the demagogues, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and Meletus on behalf of the poets.¹ Socrates was sentenced to death. The circumstances of the trial are sufficiently known, and are accurately explained by Tychsen in the Bibliothek für alte Literatur und Kunst.² But the real causes of the condemnation of Socrates are not yet accurately ascertained; and for this reason, as well as on account of the light which they must throw on his character, the whole particulars of his trial seem to require careful examination. He is generally considered as a victim of the intrigues and hatred of his enemies, especially of the sophists; and in modern times, his death has sometimes been represented as a well-deserved punishment for his anti-democratical and revolutionary ideas.

Both these views, however, take only one side of the question, and I am convinced, that several causes must be taken together in order to judge impartially and to account satisfactorily for the condemnation of Socrates.

The causes which led to his condemnation appear to be of two kinds, partly direct and partly indirect. I call those indirect causes which led to the accusation of Socrates, and those direct which, independent of the points contained in the accusation, disposed the judges to pronounce the sentence of death.

The indirect causes will easily be seen, as soon as we have obtained a clear insight into the character of the

¹ Plat. Apol. c. X. Diog. Laert. II. 39.

² Part I. and II. Göttingen, 1786 and 87.

persons who accused him. Meletus who first laid the charge before the second archon, who bore the title of king, and before whose tribunal all religious affairs were brought—was the most insignificant of all, and perhaps only an instrument in the hands of the two other power-He was a young tragic poet, who, howful accusers. ever, did not sacrifice to the tragic muse with the best His memory as a poet has only been preserved from entire oblivion by the ridicule of Aristophanes.2 It was because Socrates valued true poetry so highly, that he was a great friend of Euripides, and whenever \ one of his pieces was performed, he went to the theatre;3 nay even in his old age, and during the thirty days which elapsed between his condemnation and execution, he composed poems himself; but he could not bear that those, who possessed none of the true spirit of poetry, should obtrude their poems on public attention. persons, therefore, often had to sustain the ridicule of Socrates; and it is therefore not to be wondered at, that a vain young man feeling himself hurt by the remarks of our philosopher, should seize on the first opportunity of gratifying his desire for revenge. To this, however, another reason may be added; Meletus had been one of the four who, had, at the command of the Thirty, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens.4 Socrates having refused obedience to this command, and declared it an

¹ Maxim. Tyr. Dissert. 9.

² Aristoph. Ran. 1337 et Schol. ibid.

³ Ælian, Var. Hist. II. 13.

⁴ Andocides, de Myster. p. 12 and 34 edit. Steph.

act of injustice to which he could not be accessary, must have increased the enmity of Meletus. Libanius besides, describes him as a venal accuser, who for a drachma would accuse any one, whether he knew him or not. To this report, however, we cannot attach any great importance, as we are ignorant of the source from which it was derived.

Lycon was a public orator. We know that, according to a law of Solon, ten persons were elected to this office; whose duty was to advise the people and to maintain public justice. But these orators were very often individuals, who entirely neglected their high calling; and merely attended to their own private interests, and persecuted the most honest persons, whenever their personal advantage required it. wonder that the name of an orator should be despised by every honest man? Can we wonder that a man like Socrates, whose whole heart was benevolence towards mankind, should hate these corrupters of morality and often censure their conduct in the strongest terms, when they hurried the people into the most unjust and revolting actions? On the other hand what was more natural than that Socrates should render these men his bitterest enemies, who became the more dangerous, as they scrupled not to employ any means to get rid of such a troublesome censor of their conduct.2

Anytus was the most powerful among the accusers of

¹ Apolog. edit. Reiske, p. 11 and 51.

² Προητοίμασε δὲ πάντα Λύκων ὁ δημαγωγός, says Diogenes, II. 38.

Socrates; whence the latter in an expressive manner is called by Horace 1 Anyti reus. Plato in his seventh letter ranks him with Lycon, among the most influential citizens. He had been driven into exile by the Thirty; and from this circumstance alone he would have been an interesting personage to his fellow-citizens, after the restoration of the democratical government. But his influence as a demagogue and a statesman must have been still more increased, since he himself had cooperated with Thrasybulus in expelling the Thirty.2 He carried on the business of a tanner, whereby he acquired great importance; for after the changes introduced by Cleisthenes into the constitution of Solon, every tradesman or artizan could rise to the highest honours of the state. Socrates often censured the principle, that people totally ignorant of the constitution and of public business, should have an influence in the management of state-affairs. His examples were often derived from "Thou must," said Critias in the above mentioned conversation between himself, Charicles and Socrates,3 "no longer speak of shoemakers and other artizans, for I indeed think that they are tired of thy foolish talk, by which their trade has become so notorious." In the Meno of Plato, Socrates expresses a doubt as to whether a son could be taught virtue by his parents; and uses the example of shoemakers and other artizans, who, according to his view, are themselves

¹ Sat. II. 4. 3.

² Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3.

³ Xenoph, Mem. I. 2. 37.

ignorant of virtue. Hence the multitude were not much disposed in his favour, and Anytus in the Meno declares, that he would avail himself of the influence which he possessed, to make Socrates repent of his expressions. But there were causes still more personal, which drew down upon Socrates the hatred of Anytus. The latter had entrusted two of his sons to the instructions of Socrates with the intention of educating them as orators, which was the principal way to authority and wealth in Athens at that time. In one of these young men Socrates observed superior talents, which might raise him to something better than the profession of his father, and he told him, that he must give up the trade of his father and pursue a higher course.¹ This exceedingly offended the vanity of a man, who, as a member of the popular assembly, wished to be thought a very important personage. The account of Libanius? is therefore in itself not very improbable when he says, that Anytus after having accused Socrates, promised him, that he would desist from his accusation, if the latter would no longer mention tanners, shoemakers, &c., and that Socrates refused the proposal; but we cannot place much reliance on this account, since we are ignorant of the source from which Libanius derived it, and know besides

¹ Xenoph. Apolog. § 29. Although this Apology in its present form was not written by Xenophon, it appears to express his views; the greater part of it, at least, is a compilation from the Memorabilia.

² The author of the seventh of the Socratic letters, p. 30, says: Πῶς ἀν οὖν, ὧ Ξενοφῶν, τὴν μιαρίαν τοῦ βυρσοδέψου 'Ανύτου γράφοιμι καὶ τὸ θράσος αὐτοῦ;

that he composed his Apology of Socrates, merely as an exercise in rhetoric, and was probably not much concerned about historical truth.

But there was yet another reason, for which Anytus had a personal hatred to Socrates. Anytus entertained an impure love for Alcibiades; who refused, however, to yield to his wishes.1 It was the jealousy of disappointment, that inflamed Anytus with hatred against Socrates, who loved Alcibiades most fondly; though we are in no ways authorised to suppose that he regarded him with that unnatural feeling with which it has often been attempted to pollute his reputation. These remarks sufficiently characterize Anytus. Whatever brilliant qualities the popular party in the first enthusiasm of freedom may have attributed to him, and although they may have considered him as being next to Thrasybulus, the liberator of their country from the yoke of the Thirty, he was still nothing more than an ambitious sensualist. This judgement is confirmed by several other things which are recorded of him. Aristotle² and Plutarch³ relate that he was the first who bribed the judges at Athens, when he was charged of having been guilty of treachery at Pylos, at the end of the Peloponnesian war.4

After this short sketch of the characters of his accusers,

¹ Compare Plutarch, in the life of *Alcibiades*, c. 4. See also what Athenæus (XVI. p. 534. E.) says respecting the sensuality of Anytus.

² In Harpocration, under δεκάζων.

³ Life of Coriolanus, c. 14.

⁴ Compare Diod. Sic. XIII. 64.

it will be easier to discover the true causes of the accusation of Socrates; for at first sight it is surprising, that so many other Greek philosophers, though they gave much greater offence to the popular religion, were yet allowed to live at Athens free from persecution; and that such a violent accusation should have been raised against Socrates alone. Epicurus, for instance, died in the seventy-first year of his age, highly lamented by his disciples without having ever been accused on account of his religious opinions. The causes, which led to the accusation of Socrates, may be fairly classed under four divisions which will form the subject of the following chapter.

¹ [The assertion of Wiggers that Greek philosophers, who gave offence to the popular religion, were allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, is contrary to all historical evidence. Although sceptical opinions on religion had for many years previous to the death of Socrates made considerable progress among the upper classes at Athens, it is nevertheless certain that the lower orders were strongly attached to the popular religion, and highly resented any attempts which were made to question its truth. Anaxagoras was compelled to leave Athens, notwithstanding the powerful support of Pericles, on account of his religious opinions; and Diagoras of Melos was proscribed at Athens on account of his impiety, and a reward offered to any one who should either kill him, or bring him to justice. Protagoras, also, was accused and condemned to death for having read a work, at Athens, on the nature of the gods, in which he declared that he was unable to determine whether the gods existed or not. He escaped, however; but the book was publicly burnt, and all who possessed copies were ordered to give them up. — ED.]

CHAPTER VII.

1. Every great man, especially under a democratical government and in a period of moral corruption, excites the envy of others; for it is the fate of the truly great to be envied by those who feel their own comparative inferiority. Even a superficial knowledge of the human heart shows how much we are inclined to envy those we cannot equal. Who does not remember the answer which that citizen of Athens gave to Aristides, when the latter asked him why he voted against him! If such a man be distinguished by his talents, others endeavour to degrade him, or if they do justice to his genius, speak in a derogatory manner of his feelings. But should he be a man distinguished by unusual moral goodness, by rare qualities of heart, and by a high enthusiasm for virtue and morality, he is still more in danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries; for there are always persons mean enough to suppose, because their own hearts cannot comprehend such virtues, that the low objects of vanity and selfishness influence the actions and the noble philanthropic views of the man of superior morality, and ready enough to stigmatize the teachers and benefactors of mankind, as corruptors of the people and

seducers of the young. This must be the case principally in democratical states. The more numerous the relations and combinations in a state, and the more various the conflicts of the parties with each other, the less can a man be tolerated, who rises by his superior talents and virtues above the ordinary class of men. In a monarchical state in which his influence is not so great, and the various conflicts of different powers are not so numerous, he may live, if not more honoured, at any rate more peaceably. But the greater the immorality of the citizens in a democratical state, the less likely is a man of great moral excellence to be tolerated. The contrast between him and their own corruption is a sufficient reason to excite against him their hatred and persecution. Socrates was one of these superior beings, who are born not only to enlighten his own age, but mankind in Virtue and humanity had descended upon him in their sublime purity, and had excited his unbounded veneration. Could he be otherwise than offensive to the wise and the learned of his age, to the narrow-minded quibbling sophists, the selfish demagogues and the conceited poetasters? Hence Socrates himself in Plato's Apology mentions the hatred of the multitude as the cause of his fate.1

Socrates always lived under a democratical form of government,² with the exception of the eight months, during which the Thirty possessed the supreme power.

¹ C. XVI.

² [An oligarchical form of government was established for a short time in B. c. 411.—ED.]

In his intercourse, as a teacher of the people, with the orators, sophists, poets, &c., he frequently offended them, and sometimes injured their interests. He lived, moreover, in a corrupt period. Aristophanes, Plato, the author of the Axiochus, and other contemporary writers, describe the Athenian people as inconstant and frivolous, of a cruel disposition, ungrateful to those who deserved well of their country, and jealous of men who were distinguished by their virtue and superior qualities. During the dazzling sway of Pericles, or perhaps more

¹ Aristoph. Equit. v. 40; Plat. Gorg. p. 521. C. foll; Axiochus, c. XIII. Δημος ἀχάριστον, ἀψίκορον, ἀμόν, βάσκανον, ἀπαίδευτον, ὡς ἀν συνηρανισμένον ἐκ συγκλύδωνος ὅχλου καὶ βιαίων φλυάρων. ὁ δὲ τούτω προςεταιριζόμενος, ἀθλιώτερος μακρω. Το this state of things must also be referred the passage of Pliny, in which the picture of Parrhasius is mentioned (Hist. Nat. XXV. 10.): "Δημον Atheniensium pinxit argumento ingenioso: volebat namque varium, iracundum, injustum, inconstantem; eundem inexorabilem, clementem, misericordem, excelsum, gloriosum, humilem, ferocem fugacemque et omnia pariter ostendere."

It cannot be denied that the government of Pericles was, in many respects, far from beneficial to the Athenians. He was an ambitious man, and by this disposition he was hurried into many actions injurious to his country. The diminution of the power of the Areopagus, to which Solon had wisely assigned an extensive sphere of action, is wholly unpardonable. On the other hand, we should undoubtedly be going too far, if we should credit all the assertions of the comic poets, which are partly repeated by. Diodorus and Plutarch, and attribute the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war to the intrigues by which Pericles endeavoured to escape the necessity of accounting for the treasury of the allies, which he had lavished on magnificent buildings. This opinion, though very generally maintained, and usually adopted in historical manuals, cannot be supported by any authentic testimony. Diodorus (XII. p. 503 — 505.) and Plutarch (Pericles, I. p. 647

properly speaking, of Aspasia, who had, it is true, done very much to diffuse a taste for the fine arts, vices of every description had gained the ascendancy. During the Peloponnesian war, the neglect of all moral and religious cultivation had kept pace with the decay of external worship; the spirit of the times had taken a sophistical tendency, and selfishness had so evidently become the motive to action, that even Athenian embassadors unblushingly declared to the Spartans and Melians, that it was lawful and right for the better and stronger to oppress and rule over the weak and helpless, asserting that not only all tribes of animals, but whole cities and nations acted according to this principle.1 was a very common opinion that after death the soul ceased to exist; the religious phantoms of a future state were laughed at by an age so full of conceit, that nothing but a conscience disturbed in the last moments of life, could excite an apprehension, lest those ridiculed phantoms might still not be wholly fictitious.2 But it is

foll.) might be mentioned as authorities, but it is evident that they have only copied the comic poets, without being much concerned about historical truth. Besides, their authority is little, compared with that of Thucydides, the impartial adversary of Pericles, who declares the desire to extend the power of Athens, and to humble the Spartans, to have been the true causes of the war. (I. 23. 24. 56 and 88, and II. 1. Compare Wyttenbach's review of the Lectiones Andocidea of Sluiter in the Biblioth. Crit. vol. iii. P. iii. p. 79.)

¹ Thucyd. I. 76; V. 105.

² Plat. Phæd. and de Republ. VI. That free-thinking at that time generally prevailed, is evident from the tenth book de Legibus. These principles were chiefly and eagerly adopted by young people, who made such an application of the astronomical hypo-

obvious how completely every seed of virtue must have been crushed by the government of such corrupt men as the thirty tyrants.¹

theses of Anaxagoras, that they not only denied the divinity of the stars, but at the same time hazarded the assertion, that the gods being changed into the dust of the earth, were unconcerned about human affairs.

¹ [Those persons, however, who are disposed to join in the common declamations against the vices of the Athenian constitution, would do well to weigh the following just and eloquent remarks of Niebuhr, before they pronounce an opinion. "Evil without end, may be spoken of the Athenian constitution, and with truth; but the common-place, stale declamation of its revilers would be in a great measure silenced, if a man qualified for the task should avail himself of the advanced state of our insight into the circumstances of Athens, to show how even there the vital principle instinctively produced forms and institutions by which, notwithstanding the elements of anarchy contained in the constitution, the commonwealth preserved and regulated itself. No people in history has been so much misunderstood, and so unjustly condemned as the Athenians: with very few exceptions the old charges of faults and misdeeds are continually repeated. I should say: God shield us from a constitution like the Athenian! were not the age of such states irrevocably gone by, and consequently all fear of it in our own case. As it was, it shows an unexampled degree of noble-mindedness in the nation, that the heated temper of a fluctuating popular assembly, the security afforded to individuals of giving a base vote unobserved, produced so few reprehensible decrees: and that on the other hand the thousands, among whom the common man had the upper hand, came to resolutions of such self-sacrificing magnanimity and heroism, as few men are capable of except in their most exalted mood, even when they have the honour of renowned ancestors to maintain as well as their own.

"I will not charge those who declaim about the Athenians as an incurably reckless people, and their republic as hopelessly lost, in the time of Plato, with wilful injustice; for they know not what they do. But this is a striking instance, how imperfect

2. The accusation and trial of Socrates was also in part occasioned by the hatred which the sophists bore towards him, and by the freedom with which he always expressed his opinions. How revolting must it have been to a man of correct habits of thinking, that persons assuming the venerable appellation of the wise, should have

knowledge leads to injustice and calumnies; and why does not every one ask his conscience whether he is himself capable of forming a sober judgment on every case that lies before him? A man of candour will hear the answer, in a voice like that of the genius of Socrates. Let who will clamour and scoff: for myself, should trials be reserved for my old age, and for my children, who will certainly have evil days to pass through, I pray only for as much self-control, as much temperance in the midst of temptation, as much courage in the hour of danger, as much calm perseverance in the consciousness of a glorious resolution, which was unfortunate in its issue, as was shown by the Athenian people, considered as one man: we have nothing to do here with the morals of the individuals: but he who as an individual possesses such virtues, and withal is guilty of no worse sins in proportion than the Athenians, may look forward without uneasiness to his last hour.

"The antient rhetoricians were a class of babblers; a school for lies and scandal: they fastened many aspersions on nations and individuals. So we hear it echoed from one declamation to another, among the examples of Athenian ingratitude,—that Paches was driven to save himself by his own dagger, from the sentence of the popular tribunal. How delighted was I last year, to find in a place where no one will look for such a discovery, that he was condemned for having violated free women in Mitylene at its capture. The Athenians did not suffer his services in this expedition, or his merit in averting an alarming danger from them, to screen him from punishment.

"The fathers and brothers who, in the epigraph of the thousand citizens who fell as freemen at Chæronea, attested with joy that they did not repent of their determination, for the issue was in the hands of the Gods, the resolution, the glory of man,—who

aimed at confounding the fundamental ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice! The sophists were most dangerous men, not only on account of their theoretical unbelief, which they indiscreetly preached, but also on account of their moral doctrines, which were founded on egotism and selfishness. Disinterested virtue, they de-

conferred a crown of gold on the orator, by whose advice the unfortunate attempt had been made which cost them the lives of their kinsmen, without asking whether they were provoking the resentment of the conqueror,—the people who, when Alexander, fresh from the ashes of Thebes, demanded the patriots, refused to give them up, and chose rather to await his appearance before their walls,-who, while all who flattered or feared Philip warned them not to irritate him, condemned citizens to death for buying slaves that had fallen into the hands of the Macedonians by the capture of Greek cities which had been hostile to Athens;—the people whose needy citizens, though predominant in the assembly, renounced the largess which alone afforded them the luxury of flesh on a few festivals, though on all other days throughout the year they ate nothing but olives, herbs, and onions, with dry bread and salt fish,—who made this sacrifice to raise the means of arming for the national honour;—this people commands my whole heart and my deepest reverence. And when a great man* turned away from this noble and pliable people, though certainly it did not appear every day in its holiday clothes and was not free from sins and frailties, he incurred a just punishment in the delusion which led him to attempt to wash a blackamoor white; to convert an incorrigible bad subject like Dionysius, and through his means to place philosophy on the throne in the sink of Syracusan luxury and licentiousness; and in the scarcely less flagrant folly of taking an adventurer so deeply tainted with tyranny as Dion, for a hero and an ideal. A man who could hope for success in this undertaking, and despaired of a people like the Athenians, had certainly gone great lengths in straining at gnats and swallowing camels." - Translated by Mr. Thirlwall in the "Philological Museum," No. III. p. 494—496.—ED.]

^{*} Plato.

clared, was folly, and the civil laws were at variance with the laws of nature; moderation and temperance were enemies to pleasure, and contrary to the precepts of good sense. 1 Socrates too deeply felt the corruption of his age not to oppose its authors in every way, and to express his indignation as loudly as possible. Their dazzling sophistries he opposed with weapons, which must have been very painful to conceited people, who loved anything better than the truth. Pretending to be a disciple, anxious to learn something, he attentively listened to the wisdom which flowed from the lips of the sophists; and perhaps praised it exceedingly, whilst he lamented his own dullness, and at the same time willingly admitted the truth of the greater part of their doctrines, and only now and then indulged in a little modest question, which they could not refuse to answer to an industrious disciple, and which appeared to them so insignificant, that it could not contribute in the least to refute their assertions. But he went gradually further, and traced things to their ultimate causes, and thus extorted from them the confession of their igno-He perhaps even followed them as he did Euthydemus, until he could engage them, with propriety in a conversation which would humble their pride.

¹ Compare Plato, in the Gorgias, and de Republ. II. The beautiful allegory of Prodicus, "Hercules at the cross-way," which has acquired such celebrity, and perhaps owes its perfection to Xenophon, at least as far as its form is concerned, was only a declamation, and probably belonged to those show-speeches which this sophist delivered in the cities of Greece. Philostr. de vit. Sophist. p. 482 foll.

method of examining and refuting (έξετάζειν and έλέγχειν according to the expression of the Socratic philosophers), with which his disciples, imitating their teacher, tried every one who gloried in his wisdom, was still more disagreeable to the sophists. But the indignation of those who had been tested in this manner did not fall on the disciples, but on Socrates himself, as he asserts in the Apology. 1 It cannot be denied that the sophists, who before enjoyed a high degree of estimation, were deprived by Socrates of a considerable portion of their influence in Greece, and especially at Athens. And in revenge they did every thing to degrade him in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, and to prove that the real motives of his actions were bad. "He seduces the young, and introduces new gods:"2 — these were the hateful calumnies by which they attempted to injure his reputation with the people, and which were faithfully repeated by Meletus in his accusation; — calumnies which must have represented Socrates to the people in a more odious light, as the constitution of Athens was intimately connected with its religion, and the interest of the one was necessarily involved in that of the other.

But in general it was by too freely expressing what

¹ C. X.

² Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. § 49: Σωκράτης τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε: a charge which had been brought against Socrates by Aristophanes. Excellent remarks on the ironical manner in which Socrates treated the sophists, are found in Reinhard's essay: De Methodo Socratica, in the first vol. of his Opuscul. Academ., edited by Pölitz. Lipsiæ, 1808.

he thought, that Socrates made enemies, and brought on his accusation. He not only combated the fallacies and the perversity of the sophists, but every kind of vice and folly, and called them by their true names; he attacked every error, and that the more zealously, the closer it was connected with morality. Thus not only sophists, but poets, orators and demagogues, soothsayers and priests, became his enemies. He despised the comic poets who delighted the multitude at the expense of morality; and bad poets and sophistical orators tell the sting of his irony. The demagogues hated him because he was the opponent of their teachers, the sophists, from whom many among them had learnt the art of deceiving the What could indeed be more absurd in the eyes of reason, than that persons totally ignorant of the constitution and public business, such as artizans, tanners, shoemakers, &c., should have an influence on the conduct of public affairs? These he made the objects of his satire, and exposed the absurdity of their pretensions. Socrates had, besides, a prejudice against mechanical arts, which he sometimes expressed too indiscreetly and offensively. Thus he says to Critobulus: 1 " Mechanical arts are despised, and indeed it is not with injustice that they are little valued by states; for they are injurious to the bodies of the workmen as well as to the superintendents, since they render it necessary for them to sit, and to remain constantly in-doors; and many of them pass all the day near the fire. And whenever the body is languid, the mind loses its energy.

¹ Xenophon, Œconom. IV. 2.

those arts allow us no time to devote to our friends and to the state, so that such people are little useful to their friends, and bad protectors of their country. Nay in some, principally in warlike states, no citizen is allowed to pursue mechanical arts."

Even the tyranny of the Thirty, as we have seen, did not escape the satire of Socrates. The priests too, as we know from the Euthyphron of Plato, were obliged to hear from his lips the truth that their ideas of divine worship were totally erroneous. 1 It is natural enough, that Socrates should have made a number of individuals his enemies by these free expressions, and especially by interfering with the interests of the priests, who de-

¹ That poets were allowed to express themselves freely on religious subjects, and that philosophers were deprived of this privilege, may be accounted for in the following way. Poets wrote for the sake of amusement; a little freedom was easily granted to them, provided they made the people laugh; but the words of a philosopher had a more serious tendency. Besides, we know that dramatic representations originated in the festival of Dionysus, which was solemnised as licentiously as the Bacchanalia of the Romans. On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between political religion, i. e. that which being intimately connected with the constitution was observed in public festivals and ceremonies, and the monstrous mass of fables concerning the origin and history of the gods; for at Athens religious belief was unconnected with public worship. With regard to mythological stories, the Greeks were allowed to express themselves as freely as they liked, provided they did not attack the mysteries, or doubt the existence of the gods. Proofs of this we find not only in the comic writers, but in the most celebrated tragic poets, as Æschylus, and Euripides, and in the history of Alcibiades. But it is surprising that Xenophanes in Magna Græcia was allowed to express himself so freely on the state-religion, whilst philosophical opinions much less connected with religion proved so dangerous to Anaxagoras at Athens.

manded the greatest submission, as their religious system did not bear a free examination. The analogy of history and daily experience shows this sufficiently, even if we leave out of consideration the facts stated in the accusation.

3. The odious light in which Socrates was represented by Aristophanes, created enemies to the former, and contributed to his accusation. The assertion founded on the report of Ælian, 1 that Aristophanes had been bribed by the enemies of Socrates, especially by Meletus and Anytus, to represent him in a ridiculous light, though it was in former times almost generally believed, is certainly destitute of any historical evidence. tus was a young man when he accused Socrates (véos, βαθυγένειος, he is called in the Euthyphron of Plato): how is it possible that twenty-three years 2 before that time he should have bribed Aristophanes? On the first representation of the Clouds, Anytus was only fourteen years old, and on good terms with Socrates, as we are told by Plato. With our present accurate knowledge of the nature of the so-called old Attic comedy, we cannot even suppose that Aristophanes was a personal enemy of Socrates, 3 though he represented him to

¹ Var. Hist. II. 13.

² The Clouds were performed 423 B. c., on the festival of Dionysus.

³ The scholiasts, endeavouring to account for the odious light in which Socrates is represented in the Clouds, are of different opinions, some ascribing it to the inveterate hatred of the comic poets against the philosophers, others to personal jealousy, since Socrates had been preferred by king Archelaus to Aristophanes,

The manner in which Socrates lived was a subject too tempting for a comic poet not to have introduced, though he might not have been provoked by any external causes. How many truly comical scenes might be derived from Socrates gazing at one object for twenty-four hours, and from the many anecdotes which were told of him; in addition to which, we must not forget his resemblance to a Silenus, and many other peculiarities in his conduct. On the other hand, however, it would

&c. But all these hypotheses can easily be dispensed with. The comic poet took up any subject which did not appear to be wanting in comical interest, and made it suit his purpose. Besides, Aristophanes was not the only one who brought Socrates on the stage. Eupolis and Amipsias did the same (see Diog. Laert. II. 18. Schol. ad Nub. 96 and 129.), and Socrates shared this fate with all the distinguished men of his age, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Euripides. Thus the Frogs of Aristophanes were a satire upon Euripides, and, to a certain extent, upon Æschylus also. These comedies gave great delight to the multitude, as they considered it an essential part of their democratical liberty to laugh with impunity at the most eminent men of the age; even their demagogues, the adored Pericles and Cleon, were not spared. attack the People was, properly speaking, not allowed, — though Aristophanes made occasional exceptions,—for it was sacred; but every individual might be brought on the stage by the comic poet. Xenoph. De Republica Athen. c. 2. The first archon, whose name could not be profaned on the stage, formed the only exception. Compare the Schol. on the Clouds, 1. 32.

Plat. Sympos. p. 220. C. "Meditating on some subject, he once stopped somewhere, early in the morning (viz. during the expedition against Potidæa), and as he did not succeed in his search, he remained in deep thought, standing on the same spot. When it had become noon-time, he attracted the attention of the people, and one said to another: 'Socrates has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early

be going too far to assert that the ridiculous representation of Socrates had no influence on his fate. Even a cursory perusal of the Clouds of Aristophanes must convince the reader that every thing is calculated to exhibit Socrates in an odious light, as seducing the young, introducing new gods, and consequently as highly injurious to the commonwealth; and it is surprising to see these charges, twenty-three years afterwards, repeated by Meletus. Socrates himself, in the Apology, says that Aristophanes, and his party, were enemies far more dangerous to him than his accusers, and that Meletus in reality had only repeated the charges of the former. ²

hour in the morning.' In the evening when he was still standing, there some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till day-break, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away."—Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att. II. 1.

² Έμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, says he, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες οῦς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ "Ανυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὡ ἄνδρες, οῦ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν* οὖτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι,

^{*} A man who investigates all things above and below the earth (μετεωροφροντιστής, is the expression of Aristophanes,) was an atheist, according to the ideas of the Athenian people, for a natural philosopher and an atheist were synonymous appellations. These natural philosophers were also called μετεωρολέσχαι. A sophist is a person who gives to a bad cause the appearance of a

Aristophanes and his party, it is true, could not directly contribute to the accusation of Socrates, for the times were too distant; but they assisted to prejudice the minds of the people against our philosopher, and to exhibit him not only as an object of ridicule, but as a man dangerous to the constitution. This was certainly an effect which these calumnies were calculated to produce, and in which they wonderfully succeeded. Mele-

ταύτην φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσί μου κατήγοροι οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντες οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὖτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὸν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταὑτη τῷ ἡλικία λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἢ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. "Ο δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱόν τε αὑτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εῖ τις κωμφδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ῶν. C. II.

good one, by means of eloquence. This proves that Aristophanes did not distinguish Socrates from the sophists: and indeed proofs of this are met with throughout the Clouds. Thus Socrates involume the Clouds, the protecting deities of the sophists; Socrates teaches how the λόγος δίκαιος may be conquered by the λόγος άδικος; he makes astronomical researches (to this must be referred his soaring in the air in a basket, v. 184 foll.); and he receives money for his instructions (v. 98. 99. 113—115. 245. 246.) A slight allusion to the sophistry of Socrates we find also in the answer of Ischomachus (in Xenoph. Œconom. c. 11. § 25.) to the question, how Ischomachus was getting on with his lawsuit: "When it is sufficient," he says, "for my defence to tell the truth, very well; but when I have recourse to lies, dear Socrates, I cannot give to the bad cause the appearance of a good one." The opinion of those who suppose that Aristophanes had been induced by the sophists to abuse Socrates, may be thus satisfactorily refuted.

tus would perhaps not have ventured to come forth with an accusation against Socrates, had not a favourite poet of the Athenian people paved the way, and indirectly undertaken his accusation. "Let us go back," says Socrates, in the Apology, "to the commencement, and the first charge from which the calumny has arisen, relying on which, Meletus has brought the .present charge against me." That the Clouds of Aristophanes did not obtain the prize, but a play of Cratinus, who contested for it with him and Amipsias, cannot surprise us; nor should it lead us to the conclusion, that the Clouds of Aristophanes were unfavourably received by It was not the applause of the people the Athenians.1 which decided the prize, but judges were especially appointed for that purpose; who were often biassed by opposite motives, and who may have been influenced in this instance by circumstances unknown to us.2

^{&#}x27;1 Argum. II. ad Nubes edit. Herm. says that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the success of this piece. According to Ælian's account (Var. Hist. II. 13.) the people were so much pleased with the Clouds of Aristophanes, that they exclaimed: "No one but Aristophanes ought to be rewarded with the prize." Aristophanes himself considered it the most perfect of his comedies (Nub. v. 522, and Vespæ, v. 1039). The account of Ælian, however, deserves just as little credit as the anecdots which he relates immediately after it, that Socrates knowing that he would be the object of bitter satire, was not only present during the performance, but that having heard that many strangers were present, and were inquiring who Socrates was, he came forth in the midst of the comedy, and remained standing in a place where he could be observed by all, and compared with the copy.

² [For an account of the Clouds of Aristophanes, see a note at the end of this chapter. — Ep.]

- 4. Socrates was not in favour of a democratical form of government: this must also have contributed to his accusation. Socrates, like the sages of antiquity in general, approved of an aristocracy in the original sense of the word, viz. a constitution which entrusted the supreme power to the hands of the best in a moral point of view. Socrates was aware how dangerous it is to intrust the supreme power to the hands of an uneducated populace; his own experience taught him how easy it was for selfish demagogues to gain favour with an in-
- ¹ An aristocracy, according to the conceptions of the Athenians before the time of Alexander the Great, was not opposed to democracy, but to oligarchy. In an aristocracy the people always had great influence, but in an oligarchy they were entirely deprived of it. One of the principal passages relating to this point is in the Menexenus of Plato, p. 238. C. Plato there represents Socrates as repeating a funeral discourse of Aspasia, in honour of those who had died for their country. Πολιτεία γάρ τροφή άνθρώπων έστί, says Aspasia, καλή μέν άγαθων, ή δε έναντία κακών. ως οθν εν καλή πολιτεία ετράφησαν οι πρόσθεν ήμων, άναγκαῖον δηλωσαι, δι' ήν δή κάκεῖνοι άγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσίν, ων οίδε τυγχάνουσιν όντες οἱ τετελευτηκότες. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτή πολιτεία και τότε ην και νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν ή νῦν τε πολιτευόμεθα και τον άει χρόνον έξ έκείνου ώς τα πολλά. καλει δε ό μέν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ῷ αν χαίρη. ἔστι δὲ τῷ άληθεία μετ' εύδοξίας πλήθους άριστοκρατία. βασιλεῖς μέν γάρ άει ήμιν είσιν ούτοι δέ τοτέ μέν έκ γένους, τοτέ δέ αίρετοί. έγκρατές δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς δίδωσι καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς ἀεὶ δόξασιν άρίστοις είναι, καὶ οῦτε άσθενεία, ούτε πενία, ούτε άγνωσία πατέρων άπελήλαται ούδείς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται ὥςπερ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, άλλὰ είς δρος, ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἡ ἀγαθὸς είναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει. Compare with this Xenoph. Mem. IV. 6. § 12: "Whenever public offices were held by persons who executed the will of the law, Socrates considered the government to be an Aristocracy." More arguments in support of this opinion are given by Luzac. l. c. p. 67.

constant multitude, and to carry plans into execution, which were often highly injurious to the whole nation. Hence, he frequently spoke in a sarcastic manner of the Athenian constitution, and satirised their bean-archons.1 Socrates said to Charmides, an able young man, who, however, was too timid to speak in the public assembly,2 "Is it the fullers that thou art afraid of, or the shoemakers? the carpenters, or the smiths? the peasants, or the merchants, or the higglers who exchange things in the market, and think of nothing else but how they may sell at the highest price, what they have bought at the lowest? for of such people the assembly is composed." Still more forcible is the account given by Ælian,3 who appears to have confounded Charmides with the more celebrated Alcibiades: "Thou surely art not afraid of that shoemaker?" When Alcibiades denied this, he

¹ Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. § 9. The archons were elected by beans: white beans were used in voting for a candidate, black ones in voting against him. The names of the candidates for the βουλή were put into one vase, and into another an equal number of beans, fifty of which were white, the remainder black. taneously with the name of a candidate drawn from one vase, a bean was drawn from the other. A white bean accompanying the name made the candidate a senator. Hence the expression κυαμευτοί ἄρχοντες for senators. That Socrates was averse to the democratical constitution of the Athenians, is also stated by Ælian, Var. Hist. III. 17: Σωκράτης εν τη μεν 'Αθηναίων πολιτείφ οὐκ ἡρέσκετο. τυραννικήν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικήν ἐώρα τήν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. This sentiment was also maintained by his successors. Plato and Xenophon, although differing in their principles and opinions on other subjects, agree with each other on this point.

² Xenoph. Mem. III. 7. § 6.

³ II. 1.

said: "but perhaps that crier in the market or the tent-maker?" When Alcibiades answered this also in the negative, "Well then," said Socrates, "do not the people of Athens consist of nothing but such persons? and if thou art not afraid of each of them individually, thou canst not be afraid of them when they are assembled." Even in his Apology he did not conceal his anti-democratical feelings. It is but natural that such assertions of our philosopher should have inflamed those irritable Athenian democrats, according to whose ideas the election of magistrates by lot was the very foundation of their democracy, and that they should have been strongly inclined to accuse a man who held such opinions.

This anti-democratical mode of thinking was not only thought to be discovered in the expressions of Socrates; his having educated the cruel tyrant Critias, was alleged as an actual proof of it, although Socrates had not the slightest share in his tyrannical principles. We cannot be surprised that in the accusation of Socrates no mention was formally made of Critias and of the Thirty Tyrants in general, of Alcibiades, Hipparchus, and many others of the oligarchical party, who had been more or less intimately connected with Socrates; nor can it be maintained that these connections had no influence on the accusation. The omission of this very important point must be ascribed to the general amnesty

¹ C. XIX. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὖτε ὑμῖν οὖτε ἄλλφ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῷ πόλει γίγνεσθαι.

which had been proposed by Archinus, and was established after the banishment of the Thirty.1 Xenophon, the most trustworthy of all the writers who has transmitted to us accounts of Socrates, says² that the ridicule of Socrates on the election of magistrates by lot, his having instructed Critias, and quoted passages from the most eminent poets, which bestowed praise on tyranny, were the principal articles in the second charge which accused Socrates of seducing the young.3 account of Xenophon strongly confirms the supposition, that the connection between Socrates and Critias, whose cruelties were still well remembered by the democratical party, must have contributed to his accusation, and is indeed very probable, when we only consider the state A passage of Æschines, the orator, might of affairs. also be adduced to confirm this opinion, but we have reason to doubt the veracity of Æschines, whenever it is his object to bring charges against his adversary, Demos--This passage occurs in the speech against Timarchus,4 which Æschines delivered before the assembly of the people. "You who have put to death Socrates, the sophist, whom you knew to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants who abolished your democracy, will you allow yourselves to be moved by the

¹ Plat. Menexen. p. 234. B.

² Memorab. I. 2.

³ Xenophon clearly seeing that he could not refute the first of these facts, namely, the ridicule on the κυαμευτοί, wisely avoids mentioning it.

⁴ In the third volume of Reiske's edition of the "Oratores Græci," p. 168.

private interest of an orator like Demosthenes?" The name of sophist, which Æschines must surely have known not to have belonged to Socrates, but which orators frequently applied to philosophers to express their contempt of them, and the mention of Critias, are sufficient to prove the intention of Æschines, who wished by these sentiments to hurt the feelings of Demosthenes, a disciple of Plato, and a kinsman of Critias.

[THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES.

In the Clouds of Aristophanes, which was exhibited B. C. 423. Socrates is introduced as the great master of the school of the Sophists. A plain, simple citizen of Athens, named Strepsiades, engaged in husbandry, having married into a family of distinction, and having contracted debts through the extravagance of his wife (v. 49. sq. 437. sq. ed. Dindorf) and his son's (Pheidippides) fashionable love of horses, in order to defeat the impending suits of his creditors, wishes to place his son in a school of philosophy and rhetoric, where he may learn the arts of oratory, and of turning right into wrong, in order thereby to repair the ills which he had chiefly brought upon himself. On the son's refusal, the father applies in person to the master of the school, who is named Socrates: by him he is solemnly initiated, instructed, and examined, but being found too old and stupid to learn, he is dismissed; upon which, after he has given his son some samples of the new philosophy, he forces him much against his will into the school: here the young man makes such great and rapid progress in learning, that he is able to teach his father, who exults at his brilliant success, the most extraordinary tricks for the attainment of his object; but as he is now himself enlightened, and has raised himself above considerations of right and duty, he denies and scorns in the coarsest manner the relation in which he stands both to his father and mother; he defends his new opinions with the refinements of sophistry, and retorting upon his father the good lessons he had before received from him, pays him in the same coin. Upon this the father, cured of his error, in wishing to get rid of his embarrassments by dishonesty and sophistical chicanery, returns to take revenge upon the school of that pernicious science and upon its master, who is obliged to receive back all the subtle arguments and high-flown words, which he had himself made use of, and the old man levels the establishment to the ground.

From this connected view of the story, we see that it is throughout directed against that propensity of the Athenians to controversies and law-suits, which was eminently promoted by their practice of getting into debt; and against the pernicious, sophistical and wrangling oratory, which was ever at the service of this disposition, in the courts of justice, and particularly in the discussion of all public transactions; and Aristophanes never loses an opportunity of combating these two vices.

Moreover, as the story is set in action by the perverse purpose awakened in Strepsiades, as it comes to an end when he is cured, and as this change arises from the unexpected and extravagant result of the experiment upon Pheidippides, who is to be the instrument of the father's design; the school of sophistry in which the youth is to be formed, is clearly the hinge on which the whole action turns; for its influence on Pheidippides decides the success or failure of the views of Strepsiades, and consequently the issue of the story of the drama.

This, therefore, is the view which we must take of the relation of the several parts to each other; namely, that the principal character to which the whole refers, is not Socrates, who has generally been considered to be so, in consequence of the story lingering so long at his shop, and of his being the sufferer at the conclusion, but Strepsiades himself; whereas Socrates is the intermediate party who is to instruct Pheidippides for the vicious purposes of the father; and this he executes so perfectly, that the old gentleman is at first deceived; but he soon reaps fruits, the nature of which opens his eyes to his own folly, and to the destructive tendency of this system of education.

In "The Clouds" the poet introduces us to the original source,

whence, according to his view, the new-fangled and pernicious system of education took its rise, namely, the school of sophistical eloquence. He represents the Phrontisterion or subtlety shop, as its seat and centre of union, this being necessary in a dramatic point of view; and he concentrates in the schoolmaster those essential properties of the school, which are to explain his purpose, interwoven as they are with others, which belong to the real Socrates, under whose name and mask he clothed the dramatic personage. This individual centralization was indispensably requisite for the conduct of the drama; and this is the poet's only excuse for representing Socrates within the walls of a school, as the philosopher himself was continually moving about in public, a contradiction, which has been considered as a convincing proof that the whole exhibition, as we have it, could not have been intended really for him. Aristophanes lays open to us, with the colouring, indeed, of a caricature, the whole interior sayings and doings of the school; he draws a sketch of the methods and means of instruction peculiar to it; and he shews the extent to which the mischief has already gone, since the $\lambda \delta \gamma o \zeta \delta i \kappa \alpha i o \zeta$ is unable to defend himself; he points out likewise, what results we are to expect from the school, what immediate calamities threaten not merely the parents themselves, who were blind enough to encourage such a system of education, but the common-weal also; and finally, what the people ought to do, to annihilate the evil at its source.

• The Socrates in "The Clouds" must not, therefore, be considered as an individual, or as the copy of an individual; but as the principal personages in Aristophanes are for the most part symbolical, he too must be viewed as symbolical, that is, as the representative of the school and of its principle. And as we see in him a good deal, which answers to the individual, whose name and mask he bears, and much too, which is heterogeneal to him, although by means of certain allusions, and the ingenuity of dramatic combination, these two are amalgamated together; so also in the characters of Strepsiades and Pheidippides, many traits which are perfectly apposite to the objects which they are intended to typify, are combined with many which are extravagantly caricatured, and the creatures of poetic fiction. Strepsiades for example, whose name is explained by his tendency to evil (v. 1455 comp. v. 88), and by the pleasure he takes in distorting right (v. 434), is the representative of the good old time, working out its own destruction by the abandonment of the laborious, frugal, peasant's life, by illustrious marriages, and female influence, by the extravagant life which his son leads in consequence of it, and by the debts and lawsuits which this occasions, all of which open the door to sophistical eloquence; or if you will, he is the representative of the elder portion of the Athenian people, in this dangerous crisis of their affairs. some other characters of the comedies of Aristophanes, which present the people under different aspects, for example, the Demos himself in "The Knights," and Philocleon in "The Wasps," there is always a groundwork of truth and honesty, but which is alloyed with falsehood, and led into error, and whose cure and restoration to a healthy and vigorous state and a right view of things, form the end and aim of the dramas; so likewise in "The Clouds," a sickly disposition of the people, the nature and bent of which are pourtrayed under the character of Strepsiades, in the most lively colours of caricature, is represented as the school, in which that personage seeks the means of obtaining the object of his desires, but is cured the moment that the full operation of those means is unexpectedly brought to light. Pheidippides, on the other hand, is the picture of the new or modern times, in the young men of fashion just coming out into the world, whose struggle with the older generation is pointed out by words of derision and raillery. The fashionable and chevaleresque passion for horses and carriages in the young men of the time, was accompanied by $\lambda a \lambda \iota \dot{a}$ (loquaciousness) and her whole train of vicious propensities; and yet how much better would it be, as Aristophanes implies, to leave the youth to these pursuits, and honourably bear up against the lesser evil of the debts, which had grown out of them, than that from selfish and dishonest motives encouragement should be given to what was calculated to poison the youths in their hearts' core, and thereby to bring disorder into all domestic and political relations! In this sense, when Pheidippides expresses his delight and satisfaction with what he had gained from the art of oratory, as it put him in a situation to prove that it was right for a son to correct his father, Strepsiades retorts upon him in these words:—

"Ride on and drive away, 'fore Jove! I'd rather keep a coach and four, than be thus beat and mauled."

This, then, is the lesson, which Aristophanes would give to his

contemporaries in Athens, by "The Clouds." If one of the two must have its way, let the young men indulge themselves in their horses and carriages, however it may distress you; but check the influence of these schools, unless you wish to make a scourge for yourself and for the state; exterminate in yourselves that dishonest propensity which entangles you in lawsuits, and which, by means of those schools, will make your sons the instruments of your ruin! The younger population he strives to deter from the same fate by a display of the manners of the school, and of the pale faces and enervated limbs which come out of it (v. 102, 504, 1012, 1171).

We cannot, therefore, say that the play of "The Clouds" is pointed at any one definite individual; but it reproves one general and dangerous symptom of the times, in the whole habits and life, political and domestic, of the Athenians, developing it in its source, in every thing which fostered it, and made it attractive, in the instruments by which it was established, and which gave to it its pernicious efficiency; and thus whilst he strictly and logically deduces real effects from real causes, as far as this developement is concerned, the personages which bear a part in the action, are consequently one and all historical. Hence we can very well understand the striking references in particular characters to certain individuals; and I think it more than probable, that such reference is intended, not merely in the personage which bears the name of Socrates, but also in that of Pheidippides; whilst in the character of Strepsiades the poet only meant to point to the people in general.

The excessive love of horses exhibited in Pheidippides, and the extravagance consequent upon it, the rapid strides too, which he makes in readiness of speech, in debauchery, and in selfish arrogance, and the relation in which he stands to Socrates, evidently point, without further search, to Alcibiades, in whom we find all these features united, on whom all the young men of the higher classes of his time pinned their faith, and whom they assisted a few years afterwards, in carrying through his political projects.

In "The Clouds," Aristophanes introduces Alcibiades as a ready orator and a debauchée, as the fruit of that school, from which, as the favourite pupil of Socrates, he seems to have issued, in short, as the type of Pheidippides; although all the traits attributed to the latter are not to be looked for individually in

Alcibiades, and although his name does not occur in the course of Moreover, the supposed lineage of Pheidippides, whose mother (v. 46) was the niece of a Megacles, the frequent mention of that uncle (v. 70, 124, 825), and that of his descent from a celebrated ancient lady of the name of $Koi\sigma \dot{\nu}\rho a$, distinctly point to Alcibiades, whose mother, Deinomache, was herself a daughter of Megacles,2 and from whose family the Alcmæonidæ, to which Κοισύρα belonged, he had inherited his strong passion for a well-furnished stable.3 This passion is, indeed, brought forward in the care taken by Pheidippides' mother, that the word $i\pi\pi\sigma_{0}$ should be introduced somehow or other into his name; as in truth it did occur also in $I\pi\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$, the daughter of Hipponicus, and wife of Alcibiades. With all these circumstances to point it out, the part of Pheidippides in the play could not have failed to remind the Athenians of Alcibiades, who, about this time, or somewhat ealier, began to neglect, as Isocrates says,5 the contests of the gymnasia (and this is an important matter in reference to the play of "The Clouds"), and to devote himself to those equestrian and charioteering pursuits, to which he was indebted for his victory at the Olympic games. name of Pheidippides, is not a pure invention of Aristophanes; but forms at once a connecting link between the youth himself, and that Pheidippus, son of Thessalus,6 who was one of the ancestors of the Thessalian Aleuadæ, famous for their breed of horses; and, at the same time, by its final syllables, it keeps up the allusion to Alcibiades, who had likewise learned the science of the manège. both in riding and driving, in Thessaly; and the same comparison with the Aleuadæ is implied, which we find also in Satyrus, who tells us that Alcibiades spent his time in Thessaly,

¹ V. 48 and 800.

² Plut. Alcib. c. 1.

^{*} Herodot. VI. 121.

⁴ Plut. Alcib. c. 8. ·Isocr. Or. de Bigis, p. 509, ed. Bekker.

⁵ L. c. compare Plut. Alcib. c. 11.

⁶ Homer II. II. 678.

⁷ In Athenæus XII. c. 9, p. 534—6. Έν Θετταλία δὲ ὶπποτροφῶν καὶ ἡνιοχῶν, τῶν 'Αλευαδῶν ἱππικώτερος.

breeding horses, and driving cars, with more fondness for horseflesh even than the Aleuadæ. An allusion, also, to the well known infantine τραυλισμός of Alcibiades, or his defect in the articulation of certain letters, could not fail to fix the attention of the Athenian public to this remarkable personage. If then, the actor, who represented Pheidippides, did but imitate slightly this $\tau \rho \alpha \nu \lambda \iota \sigma \mu \delta \varsigma$, in appropriate passages, and if he bore in his mask and conduct any resemblance to Alcibiades, there was no further occasion whatever for his name; and we need not have recourse to the supposition, that his not being mentioned by name in the play was owing to any fear of Alcibiades, who did not understand such raillery on the part of the comic poets; since the other characteristics by which he was designated were sufficiently complete and intelligible for comic representation; and the whole was affected with much more freedom and arch roguery, than if, in addition to that of Socrates, the name likewise of Alcibiades had crudely destroyed the whole riddle, it being already quite piquant enough for a contemporary audience. The proof of an allusion in "The Clouds" to Alcibiades, and to the youths who shared in his pursuits and disposition, is confirmed also by the second argument prefixed to the play, and by the notice it contains, that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the first prize being awarded to Aristophanes; from which it is evident, even were the fact not probable in itself, that a tendency hostile to Alcibiades and his friends was perceived even by the antients in this drama.

It was also about this time that the intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates was at its height, as the flight from Delion took place in the winter of the first year of the 89th Olympiad, that is, in the year in which "The Clouds" was represented; and the share they both had in this engagement, and the assistance which Alcibiades gave to Socrates, were manifest proofs of that intimacy. Alcibiades also about this time must have been deeply engaged in public affairs.

But the question arises: why did Aristophanes, when he gave a name and mask to the master of the school of subtlety, which was so foreign to the real Socrates, select the name and mask of that very individual?

¹ Plutarch, Alcib. c. 1.

Aristophanes selected Socrates, not only because his whole exterior, and his mode of life offered a most appropriate mask for comic representation; but also (and this was his chief reason) because in these circumstances, as well as in many other points, the occupations of Socrates, and his mode of instruction bore a great resemblance to those of the natural philosophers and of the The poet thus found abundance of subject-matter, which composed a picture suited to his views; namely, to exhibit to the public, a master of the school, whence the mischief he strove to put down, was working its way into the hearts of the Athenian youths. We must also take into our consideration the important fact, that several individuals, such as Euripides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, who supported the modern system of education, were in close habits of intimacy with Socrates, and in part, too, with the natural philosophers and sophists: and this helped to give additional relief and light to the portrait of the man, who was the centre around which they moved.

It should be recollected that it was not the object of Aristophanes to represent Socrates as he appeared to his confidential pupils, to Xenophon, to Plato, to Phædo, to Cebes, and others; but how he might be represented to the great mass of the Athenian people, that is, how they comprehended and judged him from his outward and visible signs; and how they understood and appreciated the usual extravagancies of the comic poets; in short, how it was to be managed, that whilst his name, and his mask, caricatured to the utmost, were kept together by fundamental affinities, the former might appear sufficiently justified, and be not improperly placed in connection with individuals, who were displaying before the eyes of the public the germs which were developed in Alcibiades, and the early results to which they had given birth. as the people saw Socrates for ever and deeply employed, either in meditations, like the natural philosophers, φροντίζειν, or like the sophists in instructive intercourse with the youth, σοφίζεσθαι, as Pericles called it, and as Socrates was frequently engaged in conversation with those sophists, (besides many palpable points of resemblance, calculated to mislead even those who observed him more closely), it would necessarily follow, that they reckoned him one of that community, as Æschines himself does when he calls

¹ In Timarch. p. 346, ed. Bekker.

him a sophist; judging then as they did from outward appearances, they placed him in the same category with those of his associates, whom they knew to be most engaged on the theatre of public life. Aristophanes himself seems to have had no other notion of Socrates; at least the whole range of his comedy furnishes us with many characteristic traits perfectly similar to the picture we have of him in "The Clouds." In "The Birds" (v. 1282) the poet expresses by ἐσωκράτουν the ideal of a hardy mode of life, and neglect of outward appearances; and in v. 1554 he represents Socrates, who is there called the unwashed $(\tilde{a}\lambda o v \tau o \zeta_{*})$ as ψυγαγωγός, conductor of souls, maker of images, conjurer-up of spirits, who is obeyed by the shadowy forms of his scholars, amongst whom Chærephon is particularly designated, the same who is assailed also in "The Clouds," and on various other occasions by the comic poets, as the confidential friend of his youth. And not only in "The Clouds," but in "The Frogs" also, near the end, the Socratic dialogues are ridiculed, as solemn twaddle, and empty nonsense. Although therefore the chief purpose of Socrates' appearance in "The Clouds" is on account of Alcibiades, who is principally aimed at in the character of Pheidippides, and though this motive for introducing him necessarily influenced the formation of that character, yet it is evident that the picture of Socrates and his school, as portrayed in "The Clouds," was not created by Aristophanes merely for the purposes of this comedy, but that he had for his groundwork a definite and decided model. -Abridged from Süvern's essay on "The Clouds," translated by Mr. W. R. Hamilton.

"There are two points with regard to the conduct of Aristophanes, which appear to have been placed by recent investigations beyond doubt. It may be considered as certain, that he was not animated by any personal malevolence towards Socrates, but only attacked him as an enemy and corrupter of religion and morals; but on the other hand it is equally well established, that he did not merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the sophistical school, but designed to point the attention, and to excite the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject, concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and dis-

ciples. We find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers who contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of the difference between Socrates and the sophists, might still have looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is true, as we have already observed, that the poet would have willingly suppressed all reflection and enquiry on many of the subjects, which were discussed both by the sophists and by Socrates, as a presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions. But if we suppose what is in, itself much more consistent with the opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the philosopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to understand how he might have confounded him with a class of men, with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out to represent them. He probably first formed his judgment of Socrates by the society in which he usually saw him. He may have known that his early studies had been directed by Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both himself received the instruction of the most eminent sophists, and had induced others to become their hearers: that Euripides, who had introduced the sophistical spirit into the drama, and Alcibiades who illustrated it most completely in his life, were in the number of his most intimate friends. who never willingly stirred beyond the walls of the city, lived almost wholly in public places, which he seldom entered without forming a circle round him, and opening some discussion connected with the object of his philosophical researches; he readily accepted the invitations of his friends, especially when he expected to meet learned and inquisitive guests, and probably never failed to give a speculative turn to the conversation. Aristophanes himself may have been more than once present, as Plato represents him, on such occasions. But it was universally notorious, that, whenever Socrates appeared, some subtle disputation was likely to ensue; the method by which he drew out and

tried the opinions of others, without directly delivering his own, and even his professions, — for he commonly described himself as a seeker, who had not yet discovered the truth, — might easily be mistaken for the sophistical scepticism, which denied the possibility of finding it. Aristophanes might also, either immediately, or through hearsay, have become acquainted with expressions and arguments of Socrates, apparently contrary to the established religion."—Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. IV. p. 267. 268. — Ed.]

CHAPTER VIII.

THESE causes sufficiently account for the accusation of Socrates;—but why was it delayed till he had reached his seventieth year?

The hatred against Socrates, as an enemy of the democracy, did not dare to display itself previous to the banishment of Alcibiades, the powerful friend of Socrates, who still remained his friend even after he had given up his intimate acquaintance. Besides this, during the Peloponnesian war the attention of the people was engaged by more important affairs than the accusation of Socrates, and his enemies who belonged for the most part to the democratical party, had not sufficient influence during the government of the Thirty, to attempt anything against him. On the other hand, the Thirty in spite of their own corruption, could not deny him their esteem, and they also probably dreaded his friends, whose number was not small, and therefore endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to gain him over to their · interest, as we have seen in the affair of Leon of Salamis. But there was hardly a moment more favourable to the accusation of a man suspected of anti-democratic sentiments,¹ than that which the accusers of Socrates actually chose. After the recovery of democratical liberty, the Athenians still feeling the consequences of the unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, which their superstition ascribed to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes-busts by Alcibiades, and remembering the horrors with which the government of the Thirty Tyrants was branded, became more jealous of their constitution than ever, and more inclined to punish persons against whom such plausible charges could be brought, as those against Socrates, the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

But the old charge, so often repeated against philosophers,² that they introduced new gods and corrupted the young, and which was also employed against Socrates, was not followed by his immediate condemnation. We know from the Apology of Plato,³ that Meletus

That Socrates was not considered as a friend of the people according to the notions of the multitude, we also see from the Apology ascribed to Xenophon, in which great pains are taken to represent him as a $\delta\eta\mu\sigma\iota\kappa\delta\varsigma$. Compare the Apology of Libanius, p. 17: "Socrates hated democracy, and would have liked to have seen a tyrant at the head of the republic, &c." "He is an enemy of the people, and persuades his friends to despise democracy, —He praised Pisistratus, admired Hippias, honoured Hipparchus, and called that period the happiest of the Athenians," &c. These are the charges against which Socrates is defended by Libanius.

The accusation of impiety was so comprehensive, that the greatest and best men, on whom not a shadow of any other crime could fall, were charged with it. The tribunal before which they were tried, was not the same at all times, as the cause might be pleaded before the Areopagus, the senate, or the Heliæa.

³ C. XXV.

requested the assistance of the party of Anytus and Lycon, in order to induce the judges to pronounce the preliminary sentence of guilty. Had Meletus not been supported by them, he would, as Socrates himself says, have failed in his accusation, and been fined one thousand drachmas; for an accuser who failed in obtaining

1 A preliminary sentence; for a proper condemnation in matters, which were not considered criminal, only took place after a counter-estimate had been made by the defendant; and wherever a punishment was stated by the law, it was inflicted according to the law, and not left to the discretion of the judges. We find one irregularity in the trial of Socrates, for which we can only account by supposing that some expressions of Socrates were considered by the judges as personally insulting to themselves. But although the accuser thought the matter criminal (τίμημα θανάτου, he added, according to Diog. II. 40.), yet it was not treated as such by the judges. The first estimate of the punishment was made by the plaintiff, and this kind of estimating was called $\tau \iota \mu \tilde{a} \nu$; the counter-estimate was made by the defendant, and the terms for it were ἀντιτιμᾶν, ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι (Plat. Apol. C. XXVI. Compare Pollux, VIII. 150.), or $\dot{v}\pi \sigma \tau \iota \mu \tilde{a} \sigma \theta a \iota$ (Xenoph. Apol. § 23.). The positive decision of the punishment was the privilege of the judges, and to fix the punishment was called $\pi \rho \circ \varsigma \tau \iota \mu \tilde{a} \nu$. calculation of votes which Fischer has made, in a remark on the passage of Plato, is too artificial; a more simple interpretation, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and others, is that the union of the party of Anytus and Lycon was required in order to obtain, in combination with that of Meletus, a fifth part of the votes. The number of the judges in the trial of Socrates is said to have been 556. 281 voted against him, 275 for him. If Socrates had had three votes more in his favour, the numbers would have been equal on both sides, and in this case he would have been acquitted. Tychsen, by correcting Diogenes, endeavours to reconcile him with Plato, for they contradict each other with regard to the number of votes. He accordingly increases the number of judges to 559, of whom 281 condemned, and 278 acquitted him. [For an account of the number of judges who were present at the trial of Socrates, see note (c) on C. XXV of the Apology, p. 134—ED.]

less than the fifth part of the votes, was fined this sum. But even after the preliminary sentence had been pronounced, it would have been easy for Socrates to have given his trial a turn favourable to himself, if he had chosen to condescend to those practices, which other defendants had recourse to in such cases, and which men of the highest character employed. In cases which were not criminal, as stated above, a counter-estimate² took place; that is, the defendant was allowed to fix on any punishment for himself which he considered proper. It was left to Socrates to choose between imprisonment for life, exile,3 or a fine. might have escaped with a small fine, which his friends had declared themselves willing to collect for him; but he rejected this offer, as well as a speech composed by Lysias in his defence. "My whole life," he said, "forms a defence against the present accusation."

When Meletus had accused him of a crime against

¹ Meursius, Lect. Att. V. 13. Sometimes banishment was inflicted, as we see from the case of Æschines.

² Cic. de Orat. I. 54: Erat Athenis, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ æstimatio: et sententia quum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi æstimationem commeruisset.

In the Crito of Plato, C. XIV. the laws are introduced speaking thus: "Even during thy trial thou wast at liberty to declare thyself deserving exile, if thou hadst wished to do so, and with the consent of the state thou mightest have done what thou art now undertaking against her will. But thou didst even boast, as if thou wert not thyself alarmed, thou even didst say that thou wouldst prefer death to exile." It was the privilege of every Athenian citizen to avoid the severity of the laws by a voluntary exile. Pollux, VIII. 10. 117.

the republic," says Xenophon¹, "he refused doing the slightest thing contrary to the laws, although others, in opposition to the law, were accustomed to implore the compassion of the judges, and to flatter and entreat them, which frequently procured their acquittal. contrary, however easy it might have been for him to have been acquitted by the judges, if he had chosen to act in the usual manner, he preferred death in consonance with the laws, to a life maintained by their vio-Instead of trying to make a favourable lation." impression upon the judges, he pronounced these proud "If I must estimate myself according to my words. desert, I estimate myself as deserving to be maintained in the prytaneum at the public expense."2 This was the highest honour and was conferred on the prytanes, i. e. the fifty senators belonging to the presiding tribe, on the conquerors of the Olympian games, on youths whose fathers had died in defence of their country, on foreign ambassadors, &c., and at the end of his speech he ironically adds: "If I had had money, I would have estimated myself at as high a sum as I should have been able to pay, for that would not have injured me; but now I cannot do so, for I have nothing, unless you will fine me in such a sum, as I can pay. But perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver: that shall therefore be my estimate. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus are persuading me to fine myself thirty minæ, and they themselves

Memorab. IV. 4. § 4.

² Plato Apolog. C. XXVI.

are ready to answer for me: that therefore shall be my estimate, and they will be satisfactory guarantees for this sum." Such a proud answer, and the language in general which Socrates used, inflamed all the judges against him, and eighty of those who at first had been favourably disposed towards him, now voted for his death. The real cause of his condemnation was therefore the noble pride, the "libera contumacia," as Cicero4

- ¹ Apolog. C. XXVIII. The account in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon (§ 23.), that Socrates did not fine himself, nor allow his friends to do so, because this would have been acknowledging his crimes, may be reconciled with the statement of Plato quoted above; for the estimate mentioned by the latter, as appears from the whole context, is pronounced in quite an ironical tone; it is in reality no estimate. Tychsen doubts the authority of Plato, thinking that it was only the intention of Plato to immortalise the offer which he and his friends had made to Socrates. But for this supposition we have no reason whatever. Tychsen in his account of this affair follows Diogenes, who differs from Plato, in as much as he states that the estimate of the thirty minæ preceded the proud assertion that he deserved to be maintained in the Prytaneum. But the authority of Plato is surely more important. The source from which Diogenes derived his account, is unknown.
- ² Cic. de Orat. I. 54: Socrates in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.
- ³ Cic. *Ibid*: Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.
- ⁴ Cic. Tuscul. I. 24: Socrates nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia. This libera contumacia is expressed by the author of the Apology ascribed to Xenophon by $\mu \epsilon \gamma a \lambda \eta \gamma o \rho i a$. Diog. II. 24. also says of him: $\dot{\eta} \nu \delta \dot{\epsilon} i \sigma \chi \nu \rho o \gamma \nu \dot{\omega} \mu \omega \nu$ (contumax). We see from the Apology of Plato (see also Xenoph. Apol. § 14.) that the judges had

calls it, which he displayed during his trial. He fell, properly speaking, as a voluntary victim. It would, however, be improper to suppose that the proud language, which he made use of before his judges, proceeded wholly and alone from a consciousness of his own worth. The reason, for which Socrates did not wish to defend himself, and rather did every thing to dispose the judges for his condemnation, was of a religious nature, as appears from several passages of the Socratic philosophers. He was not restrained by his dæmon—this was the reason to which he referred the calmness of his mind and the omission of all that he might have done for his defence. Socrates considered himself as a man destined

taken it very ill of Socrates that he mentioned the declaration of the Delphic god, and that he spoke of a genius by whom he was guided. But they were most bitterly enraged by the manner in which he estimated his punishment. The author of the Xenoph. Apology attributes to Socrates one other expression, which must have excited the indignation of the Athenians. Socrates there tells them, that Apollo had expressed himself still more strongly in favour of Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedæmonians (who were so much detested by the Athenians), and had declared him to be the noblest, justest, and most moral of men. See § 15 and 16.

Plat. Apol. C. XVII: "Whatever you may think of my conduct and my instructions, I shall change the one as little as the other, and I will rather obey the commands of the god who sent me as your teacher, than those of men." Xenoph. Memorab. IV. 8. 5: "Dost thou not know," Hermogenes says to Socrates, "that the judges at Athens, when offended by one word, have often condemned innocent men to death, and acquitted many criminals?" "Yes, indeed, they have; but, by Zeus, dear Hermogenes," he answered, "when I was thinking of my defence before the judges, my genius opposed and warned me." Compare Xenoph. Apol. § 4.

by the deity to be a general instructor of the people, and regarded his death as a sacrifice which was demanded by the same deity. This is undoubtedly an interesting point, but at the same time one that has too frequently been overlooked in the life of Socrates.

Respecting the immediate cause of the condemnation of Socrates, we must come to the conclusion, that he did not so much fall a victim to the hatred of his enemies, as to his religious mode of thinking, combined with a strong feeling of his own worth. The indirect causes of his death were certainly his accusers, who were actuated in a great measure by very ignoble motives; but the conduct of the judges, however unjustifiable, is yet excusable in many respects. Socrates had certainly expressed himself too freely on the constitution; and he must have appeared to the democratic Athenians to have seduced the young by such an open avowal of his opinions. The second point, however, with which Socrates was charged, that he did not believe in the gods worshipped by the state, and on which even the hypothesis of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and the moon was brought to bear, was perfectly unfounded, and is satisfactorily refuted by Socrates in his Apology, and by Xenophon in the Memorabilia. On the other hand, however, even the calmest judge could not help being prejudiced against him by his pride. He appeared as a man who was in no way willing to own his errors, and who was consequently incapable of improvement. Death is indeed a very severe punishment according to our ideas, but it was not so amongst the Athenians, with

whom it was considered equal to perpetual exile, and was inflicted for crimes of a less serious nature.1

Socrates was thus condemned to drink the poisoned cup. A guarantee was demanded that he might not escape from punishment by flight; and Crito became answerable for him. According to the form then customary, as it is expressed in Plutarch's life of Antiphon, the sentence must have run thus: "Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece, has been condemned to be surrendered to the To be surrendered to the Eleven was an euphemism of the Attic language instead of, to be condemned to death; since the Athenians wished to avoid the word death, which was considered ominous. The Eleven formed a commission, which consisted of the executioner and ten individuals, named respectively by each of the ten tribes. The superintendence of the prisons was intrusted to them, and they carried into execution the sentence of the courts. After the sentence had been pronounced and made publickly known by the herald, they seized the condemned person; and after putting him in fetters, accompanied him to his prison. We must

¹ The Athenian laws in this respect were very much like the English. Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 62. says: "If a man proves to be a thief, to have stolen clothings from a bath, to be a pickpocket, to have broken through a wall, to have enslaved free citizens, or robbed a temple, he is punished with death according to the laws." If the value of things stolen in a bath exceeded ten drachmas, death was inflicted, as is observed by Hindenburg on this passage from Demosthenes in Timocrat.

suppose that these formalities were likewise observed with regard to Socrates.

After the sentence had been pronounced, Socrates once more addressed the judges who had condemned him, and with great resignation and intrepidity, spoke of the evil which they inflicted upon themselves by his punishment; and to those, who had voted for his acquittal, he spoke upon subjects, which at that moment were of the greatest interest—death and immortality. The last words of this address are particularly beautiful, and have found in Cicero¹ an enthusiastic admirer. "However, it is time for us to go,—for me to die, for you to live; which is the better, is unknown to all except to God."

When Socrates had spoken these words, he went with cheerfulness to the prison, where death awaited him. "Magno animo et vultu," says Seneca,2 "carcerem intravit." He consoled his weeping friends, who followed him; and gently reproached Apollodorus, who uttered loud complaints respecting the unjust condemnation of his master.3

¹ Tuscul. I. 41.

² Consol. ad Helviam, c. XIV.

³ The author of the so-called Apology of Xenophon perfectly agrees with Plato on these facts, which are in themselves credible enough. See Plat. Phædo. The former however adds (§ 29 foll.) that Socrates said, whilst Anytus passed by: "That man is perhaps very proud, as if he had performed something very great and sublime by having caused my death. Oh, the unhappy man, who does not seem to know that he is the conqueror who has been active for all futurity in the best and most useful manner! Homer has ascribed to some, who were near the end of their life,

The next day Socrates would have been executed, had not a particular festival, which was then celebrated at Athens, postponed it for thirty days. It was the time when the Athenians sent to Delos a vessel with presents for the oracle of Apollo, as a grateful acknowledgment for the successful expedition of Theseus against This great festival was solemnized the Minotaurus. at Athens every year, and from the moment when the vessel was adorned with a garland of laurel for its departure till the moment of its return, no criminal was allowed to be executed. The festival itself called θεωρία, was a kind of propitiation, during which the city was purified. The vessel in which the presents were conveyed to Delos, was called $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho i s$. As the vessel had been crowned the day before the condemnation of Socrates, the whole interval between this and the return of the vessel was at the disposal of Socrates to prepare himself for his death. This interval lasted, as we have said, thirty days.1

Although he was confined in irons, Socrates passed these thirty days with his usual cheerfulness, in conversation with his friends, in meditations on his future ex-

the power of foreseeing the future. Therefore I will also prophecy. For a short time I had intercourse with the son of Anytus, and he appeared to me to be of rather a strong mind: I therefore say that he will not long remain in that servile occupation which his father has chosen for him; but as he has no honest guide, he will be led away by some evil propensity, and carry his wickedness to a great extent.' A malicious prophecy, and contrary to the well-known character of Socrates.

¹ The passages upon which these statements rest, may be found in the *Crito* of Plato, and in Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. § 2.

istence, and on the history of his past life, as well as in attempts at composing verses. "During this time also," says Xenophon,1 "he lived before the eyes of all his friends, in the same manner as in former days; but now his past life was most admired on account of his present calmness and cheerfulness of mind." the conversations with his friends two are particularly interesting, which are preserved by Plato in his Crito and Phædo-in the latter not without a considerable addition of Plato's own thoughts. In the Crito he treats of the duties of a citizen. Crito, a wealthy Athenian and powerful friend of Socrates, came to him early one morning; but finding him asleep, he waited till he awoke. When he awoke, Crito discovered to him a plan of escaping from prison, which he had formed in common with his other friends; and informed him that every thing was prepared for his escape, and that an asylum was provided for him in Thessaly. A lively conversation then arose between them, in which Socrates proved to Crito that a citizen is not justified, under any circumstances, in escaping from prison.

On the day of his death, Socrates had a conversation with his friends on the immortality of the soul. The arguments adduced in the Phædo of Plato, are for the most part invented by Plato; but the real arguments of Socrates are probably preserved by Xenophon in the Cyropædia, in the dying speech of Cyrus.

The exercises which Socrates made in poetry, were versifications of a hymn to Apollo, and of some fables of

^{. 1} Mem. IV. 8. § 2.

Æsop. Socrates undertook these on account of an admonition given him in a dream. But the reason for his choosing fables of Æsop, was probably that this kind of poetry which has such a decided moral tendency, particularly agreed with his own inclinations.¹

The vessel returned from Delos; the Eleven announced to Socrates the hour of his death, and one of their executioners was ready to prepare the poisoned cup which Socrates was obliged to empty after the sun had set. At a very early hour of the day his friends had assembled around him in great numbers, and Xanthippe with her children was also present. His friends were in the deepest distress; which, according to their different characters, was more or less loudly expressed. Apollodorus wept aloud, and moved all to tears except Socrates. Xanthippe, the violent and passionate woman, was inconsolable at the prospect of the death of her husband. Without fortune, without support, without any consolation, she saw herself and her children, of whom two were still at a tender age,

¹ Πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, he says (Phædo, p. 60. E. foll.), ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλη ὅψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, Ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ώςπερ οὶ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἤ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυἑ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ᾶρα πολλάκις μοι προςτάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

left in want and misery. Socrates, probably with the intention of sparing her the distressing sight of her dying husband, requested Crito-to send her home.

The executioner entered the prison, and offered the poisoned cup to Socrates: he took and emptied it with the intrepidity of a sage who is conscious of his virtuous life; and even at the moment when he held it in his hand, he spoke, according to Cicero's expression,1 in such a manner that he appeared not to die, but to ascend into heaven. "The lower part of his body had already grown cold, he then uncovered himself, (for he had before been covered) and spoke his last words: "Crito," said he, "I owe a cock to Æsculapius. Offer one to him as a sacrifice; do not forget it." Socrates alluded in these words to the happiness he should enjoy after being delivered from the chains of his body. Crito asked, whether he wished anything else to be done. To this question Socrates made no reply, and a short time afterwards became convulsed. His eyes became dim — and he expired.2 He died in the year 400, or

¹ Tuscul. I. 29.

² All this is more circumstantially related in the Phædo of Plato. The above interpretation of the words at the end of the Phædo: "Crito, I owe a cock to Æsculapius," &c., which is also adopted by Olympiodorus, appears to be the most suitable. It is well known, how many underserved reproaches have been inflicted upon Socrates for this expression. The ecclesiastical fathers Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom and others pretended to discover in it the real belief of Socrates in polytheism. ["It is extremely difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of

according to others 399, B. c. under the Archon Laches, or Aristocrates.

the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he believed their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand he acknowledged one Supreme Being, as the framer and preserver of the universe;* used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately, concerning the object of his adoration,† and when he endeavoured to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination. it was according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator. Twe are thus tempted to imagine, that he treated many points to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible, nor very desirable, to arrive at any certain conclusion: that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the Gods, all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works, seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of

^{*} Mem. IV. 3. § 13. ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων.

[†] οί θεοί, ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.


[‡] Mem. I. 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates, from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rites of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment which charged Socrates with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity.

[§] Phædrus, p. 229.

Boreas and Orithuia, he replies, that he should indeed only be following the example of many ingenious men, if he rejected it, and attempted to explain it away;* but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted; for the subjects furnished for them by the marvellous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form, was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it; for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let those stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them." Thirlwall's "History of Greece," vol. iv. p. 268, foll. Ed.]

Diog. II. 55 and 56. Marmor. Oxon. 57. Sachse places his death in Ol. 95, 1; Fabricius and Hamberger, Ol. 94, 2. [According to Diogenes II. 43. (c. xxiii.) the Athenians immediately repented of the death of Socrates; and manifested their sorrow by closing the palæstras and gymnasia. They are said to have condemned Meletus to death; and to have banished the other accusers; and also to have erected a bronze statue of Socrates. .It is also said, in the lives of the Ten Orators, that Isocrates appeared in mourning for Socrates the day after his execution.—
ED.]

^{*} I should say that she had been carried by the north wind over the cliffs, near which she had been playing with Pharmacea.



Δ IOCENOYS Λ AEPTIOY

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΒΙΟΣ.

Ι. (18.) Σωκράτης Σωφρονίσκου μέν ἢν υἱος λιθουργοῦ, καὶ Φαιναρέτης μαίας (ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτψ φησὶν) 'Αθηναῖος, τὸν δῆμον 'Αλωπεκῆθεν.

ΙΙ. Έδόκει δὲ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδη. "Οθεν Μνησίλοχος οὕτω φησί"

Φρύγες έστὶ καινὸν δρᾶμα τοῦτ΄ Εὐριπίδου, ^τΩι καὶ τὰ φρύγανα ὑποτίθησι Σωκράτης.

καὶ πάλιν,

Εὐριπίδης, σωκρατογόμφους.

καὶ Καλλίας πεδήταις,

"Ηδη σύ σεμνή, καὶ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα. "Εξεστι γάρ μοι. Σωκράτης γὰρ αἴτιος.

'Αριστοφάνης νεφέλαις,

Εὐριπίδης δ' ὁ τὰς τραγφδίας ποιῶν Τὰς περιλαλούσας οὐτός ἐστι τὰς σοφάς.

III. (19.) 'Ακούσας δὲ 'Αναξαγόρου, κατά τινας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δάμωνος, ὡς 'Αλέξανδρος ἐν διαδοχαῖς, μετὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κατα-δίκην διήκουσεν 'Αρχελάου τοῦ φυσικοῦ' οὖ καὶ παιδικὰ γενέσ-θαι φησὶν 'Αριστόξενος.

IV. Δοῦρις δὲ καὶ δουλεῦσαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐργάσασθαι λίθους. Εἰναὶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀκροπόλει Χάριτας ἔνιοί φασιν, ἐνδε-δυμένας οὕσας. "Οθεν καὶ Τίμωνα ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις εἰπεῖν,

Έκ δ΄ ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λιθοξόος, ἐννομολέσχης, Ελλήνων ἐπαοιδὸς, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας, Μυκτήρ, ἡητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς, εἰρωνευτής.

V. Ἡν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡητορικοῖς δεινὸς, ὡς φησι καὶ Ἰδομενεύς. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸν ἐκώλυσαν τέχνας διδάσκειν λόγων, ὡς φησι Ξενοφῶν. (20.) Καὶ ᾿Αριστοφάνης αὐτὸν κωμφδεῖ, ὡς τὸν ήττω λόγον κρείττω ποιοῦντα. Καὶ γὰρ πρῶτος (ὡς φησι καὶ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν παντοδαπῷ ἱστορίᾳ) μετὰ τοῦ μαθητοῦ Αἰσχίνου ἡητορεύειν ἐδίδαξε. Λέγει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Ἰδομεμεὸς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν. Καὶ πρῶτος περὶ βίου διελέχθη καὶ πρῶτος φιλοσοφων καταδικασθεὶς ἐτελεύτα. Φησὶ δ᾽ αὐτὸν ᾿Αριστόξενος ὁ Σπινθάρου καὶ χρηματίσασθαι τιθέντα γοῦν τὸ βαλλόμενον κέρμα ἀθροίζειν εἰτ' ἀναλώσαντα, πάλιν τιθέναι. Κρίτωνα δ᾽ ἀναστῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου, καὶ παιδεῦσαι, τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν χάριτος ἐρασθέντα, Δημήτριός φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος.

VI. (21.) Γυόντα δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν Θεωρίαν μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ ἡθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν ἄρξαι ἐπί τε τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγορῷ κἀκεῖνα δὲ φάσκειν ζητεῖν,

"Ο, ττι τοι έν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' άγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

Πολλάκις δὲ βιαιότερον ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι διαλεγόμενον, κονδυλίζεσθαι καὶ παρατίλλεσθαι, τὸ πλέον τε γελᾶσθαι καταφρονούμενον καὶ πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικάκως. "Οθεν καὶ λακτισθέντα, ἐπειδὴ ἠνέσχετο, τινὸς θαυμάσαντος, εἰπεῖν, Εἰ δέ με ὅνος ἐλάκτισε, δίκην ἃν αὐτῷ ἐλάγχανον; Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Δημήτριος.

VII. (22.) 'Αποδημίας δὲ οὐκ ἐδεήθη, καθάπερ οἱ πλείους, πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι ἔδει. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν αὐτόθι μένων, φιλονεικότερον συνεζήτει τοῖς προςδιαλεγομένοις, οὐχ ὥςτε ἀφελέσθαι τὴν δόξαν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' ὥςτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐκμαθεῖν πειρᾶθαι. Φασὶ δ' Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τοῦ 'Ηρακλείτου συγγραμμα, ἔρεσθαι, Τί δοκεῖ; Τὸν δὲ φάναι, "Α μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα' οἰμαι δὲ, καὶ ἃ μὴ συνῆκα' πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ. Ἐπεμελεῖτο δὲ καὶ σωμασκίας, καὶ ἦν εὐέκτης. 'Εστρατεύσατο γοῦν εἰς 'Αμφίπολιν' καὶ Εενοφῶντα ἀφ' ϊππου πεσόντα ἐν τῷ κατὰ Δήλιον μάχη, διέσωσεν ὑπολαβών. (23.) ὅτε καὶ πάντων φευγόντων 'Αθηναίων, αὐτὸς ἠρέμα ἀνεχώρει, παρεπιστρεφόμενος ἡσυχῷ, καὶ τηρῶν ἀμύνασθαι, εἴ τις οἱ ἐπέλθοι. 'Εστρατεύσατο

δὲ καὶ εἰς Ποτίδαιαν διὰ βαλάττης πεζή γὰρ οὐκ ἐνῆν, τοῦ πολέμου κωλύοντος. "Ότε καὶ μεῖναι νυκτὸς ὅλης ἐφ' ἐνὸς σχήματος αὐτόν φασι, καὶ ἀριστεύσαντα αὐτόθι παραχωρῆσαι ᾿Αλκιβιάρη τοῦ ἀριστείου, οὖ καὶ ἐρασθῆναί φησιν αὐτὸν ᾿Αριστιππος ἐν τετάρτψ περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς. "Ιων δὲ ὁ Χῖος, καὶ νέον ὅντα εἰς Σάμον σὰν ᾿Αρχελάψ ἀποδημῆσαι. Καὶ Πυθῶδε ἐλθεῖν, ᾿Αριστοτέλης φησίν. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ εἰς Ἰσθμὸν, ὡς Φαβωρῖνος ἐν τῷ πρώτψ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων.

VIII. (24) Ἡν δὲ καὶ ἰσχυρογνώμων καὶ δημοκρατικός, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ εἶξαι τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν, κελεύουσι Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, πλούσιον ἄνδρα, ἀγαγεῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥστε ἀπολέσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνος ἀποψηφίσασθαι τῶν δέκα στρατηγῶν. Καὶ ἐνὸν αὐτῷ ἀποδράναι τῆς εἰρκτῆς, μὴ ἐθελῆσαι τοῖς τε κλαίουσιν αὐτὸν ἐπιπλῆξαι, καὶ τοὺς καλλίστους λόγους ἐκείνους δεδεμένον διαθέσθαι. Αὐτάρκης τε ἦν καὶ σεμνός.

ΙΧ. Καὶ ποτε 'Αλκιβιάδου (καθά φησι Παμφίλη ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων) διδόντος αὐτῷ χώραν μεγάλην ἵνα οἰκοδομήσηται οἰκίαν, φάναι, Καὶ εἰ ὑποδημάτων ἔδει, βύρσαν μοι ἐδίδους, τν' ἐμαυτῷ ὑποδήματα ποιησαίμην; καὶ καταγέλαστος ἄν ἡν λαβών. (25) Πολλάκις δ' ἀφορῶν εἰς τὰ πλήθη τῶν πιπρασκομένων, ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτὸν, Πόσων ἐγὼ χρείαν οὐκ ἔχω; Καὶ συνεχὲς ἐκεῖνα ἀνεφθέγγετο τὰ ἰαμβεῖα,

Τὰ δ' ἀργυρώματ' ἐστὶν, ἥ τε πορφύρα, Είς τοὺς τραγωδοὺς χρήσιμ', οὐκ είς τὸν βίον.

Υπερεφρόνησε δὲ καὶ 'Αρχελάου τοῦ Μακεδόνος, καὶ Σκώπα τοῦ Κρανωνίου, καὶ Εὐρυλόχου τοῦ Λαρισσαίου, μήτε χρήματα προσεμενος αὐτῶν, μήτε παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπελθών. Εὕτακτός τε ἢν τὴν δίαιταν οὕτως, ὥστε πολλάκις 'Αθήνησι λοιμῶν γενομένων μόνος οὐκ ἐνόσησε.

Χ. (26) Φησὶ δ' 'Αριστοτέλης, δύο γυναϊκας αὐτὸν ἀγαγέσθαι' προτέραν μὲν Εανθίππην, ἐξ ἦς αὐτῷ γενέσθαι Λαμπροκλέα, δευτέραν δὲ, Μυρτώ, τὴν 'Αριστείδου τοῦ δικαίου θυγατέρα, ἢν καὶ ἄπροικον λαβεῖν' ἐξ ἤς γενέσθαι Σωφρονίσκον καὶ Μενέξενον. Οἱ δὲ προτέραν γῆμαι τὴν Μυρτώ φασιν' ἔνιοι δὲ, καὶ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχειν ὁμοῦ. 'Ων ἐστι Σάτυρός τε καὶ 'Ιερώνυμος ὁ 'Ρόδιος. Φασὶ γὰρ, βουληθέντας 'Αθηναίους, διὰ τὸ λειπανδρεῖν, συναυ-

ξήσαι τὸ πλήθος, ψηφίσασθαι, Γαμεῖν μὲν ἀστὴν μίαν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἐτέρας ὅθεν τοῦτο ποιήσαι καὶ Σωκράτην.

ΧΙ. Ἡν δ' ἱκανὸς καὶ τῶν σκωπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπερορᾶν. (27) Καὶ ἐσεμνύνετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελείᾳ. Μισθόν τε οὐδένα εἰς-επράξατο. Καὶ ἔλεγεν, ἤδιστα ἐσθίων, ἤκιστα ὅψου προσδεῖσθαι καὶ ἤδιστα πίνων, ἤκιστα τὸ μὴ παρὸν ποτὸν ἀναμένειν καὶ ἐλαχίστων δεόμενος, ἔγγιστα εἰναι θεῶν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐνέσται καὶ παρὰ τῶν κωμφδοποιῶν λαβεῖν, οἱ λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς, δι' ὧν σκώπτουσιν, ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν. 'Αριστοφάνης μὲν οὕτως,

'Ω τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμήσας σοφίας, ἄνθρωπε, δικαίως, 'Ως εὐδαίμων παρ' 'Αθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοισι διαζῆς.

είτα,

Μνήμων καὶ φροντιστής, καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν Έν τῷ γνώμη, κοὐκ ἔτι κάμνεις, οὖθ' ἐστὼς, οὖτε βαδίζων, Οὖτ' αὖ ῥιγῶν ἄχθη λίαν, οὖτ' ἀριστᾶν ἐπιθυμεῖς. Οἴνου τ' ἀπέχη καὶ ἀδδηφαγίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνονήτων.

(28) 'Αμειψίας δ' ἐν Τρίβωνι παράγων αὐτόν φησιν οὕτως,

Σώκρατες, ἀνδρῶν βέλτιστ' ὀλίγῶν, πολλῶν δὲ ματαιότας, ήκεις

Καὶ σὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καρτερικός τ' εἶ. Πόθεν ἄν σοι χλαῖνα γένοιτο;

Τουτὶ τὸ κακὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων κατ' ἐπήρειαν γεγένηται.

Οὖτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως, οὐ πώποτ' ἔτλη κολακεῦσαι. Τοῦτο δ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπεροπτικὸν καὶ μεγαλόφρον ἐμφαίνει καὶ 'Αριστοφάνης, λέγων οὕτως,

"Οτὶ βρενθύη τ' ἐν τᾶις ὁδοῖς, καὶ τὼ ὀφθαλμώ παραβάλλεις, Κάνυποδητεῖς, κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχη, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.

Καὶ τοι ἐνίοτε πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς ἀρμοττόμενος, καὶ λαμπρὰ ἡμπίσχετο καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος συμποσίω παρ' 'Αγάθωνα βαδίζων.

XII. (29) 'Ικανός δ' άμφότερα ην καὶ προτρέψαι καὶ άποτρέψαι. "Ωσπερ τὸν Θεαίτητον, περὶ ἐπιστήμης διαλεχθεὶς, ἔνθεον ἀπέπεμψε, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησίν. Εὐθύφρονα δὲ τῷ

πατρί γραψάμενον ξενίας δίκην, περί όσιου τινά διαλεχθείς άπήγαγε. Καὶ τὸν Λύσιν δὲ ἡθικώτατον ἐποίησε προτρέψας. γάρ ικανός άπό των πραγμάτων τούς λόγους ευρίσκειν. 'Eνέτρεψε δὲ καὶ Λαμπροκλέα τὸν υίὸν τῷ μητρὶ ἀγριαινόμενον, ώς που καὶ Έενοφων είρηκε. Καὶ Γλαύκωνα μέν τὸν Πλάτωνος άδελφον θέλοντα πολιτεύεσθαι, άπέστησε, διά το άπείρως έχειν, ως φησιν ὁ Εενοφων Χαρμίδην δὲ τούναντίον ἐπέστησεν, οἰκείως ἔχοντα. (30) Ἐπῆρε δὲ καὶ είς φρόνημα Ἱφικράτην τὸν στρατηγόν, δείξας αὐτῷ τοῦ κουρέως Μίδου άλεκτρυόνας άντίον των Καλλίου πτερυξαμένους. Καὶ αὐτὸν Γλαυκωνίδης ήξίου τῷ πόλει περιποιεῖν, καθάπερ φασιανὸν ὅρνιν, ἡ ταώ. Ελεγε δὲ ώς θαυμα, τὰ μὲν ἕκαστον είπειν ἂν ραδίως ὅσα ἔχοι, φίλους δ' οὐκ ὰν ὀνομάσαι ὁπόσους κέκτηται οὕτως ὁλιγώρως ἔχειν περὶ αὐτούς. 'Ορῶν δ' Εὐκλείδην ἐσπουδακότα περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικούς λόγους, 'Ω Εὐκλείδη, ἔφη, σοφισταῖς μέν δυνήση χρῆσθαι, άνθρώποις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. "Αχρηστον γὰρ ῷετο είναι τὴν περὶ ταῦτα αίσχρολογίαν, ως καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμω φησί.

XIII. (31) Χαρμίδου τε οἰκέτας αὐτῷ διδόντος, ϊν' ἀπ' αὐτῶν προσοδεύοιτο, οὐχ εϊλετο καὶ κάλλος ὑπερεῖδεν 'Αλκιβιάδου, κατά τινας.

ΧΙV. Καὶ ἐπήνει σχολήν, ὡς κάλλιστον κτημάτων, καθὰ καὶ Ἐνοφῶν ἐν συμποσίφ φησίν. Ελεγε δὲ καὶ Ἐν μονον ἀγαθὸν εἰναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ Ἐν μόνον κακὸν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν. Πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαν οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἔχειν πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον κακὸν. Εἰπόντος γοῦν τινος αὐτῷ ὡς εἴη ᾿Αντισθένης μητρὸς Θράττης, Σὰ δ' ῷου, ἔφη, οὕτως ἀν γενναῖον ἐκ δυοῖν ᾿Αθηναίων γενέσθαι; Φαίδωνα δὲ δι' αἰχμαλωσίαν ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθήμενον προσέταξε Κρίτωνι λυτρώσασθαι, καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀπειργάσατο.

XV. (32) 'Αλλά καὶ λυρίζειν ἐμάνθανεν, ὅτε καιρός μηδὲν λέγων ἄτοπον είναι, ἄ τις μὴ οίδεν ἐκμανθάνειν. "Ετι τε ώρχεῖτο συνεχὲς, τῷ τοῦ σώματος εὐεξία λυσιτελεῖν ἡγούμενος τὴν τοιαύτην γυμνασίαν, ὡς καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἐν συμποσίω φησίν.

XVI. Έλεγε δὲ καὶ προσημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ. Τό τε εὖ ἄρχεσθαι, μικρὸν μὲν μὴ εἰναι, παρὰ μικρὸν δέ. Καὶ εἰδέναι μὲν μηδέν, πλὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι. Τούς τε τὰ ώρια πολλοῦ ἐωνημένους, ἀπογινώσκειν ἔλεγεν εἰς τὰς ὥρας ἐλθεῖν. Καὶ ποτε ἐρωτηθεὶς, τίς ἀρετὴ νέου; Τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, εἰπεν. Ἔφασκέ τε δεῖν γεωμετρεῖν, μέχρι ἄν τις μέτρῳ δύνηται

γην τε παραλαβείν και παραδούνα. (33) Εύριπίδου δ' εν το Αύγη είποντος περί άρετης,

Κράτιστον είκη ταῦτ' ἐᾶν ἀφειμένα,

άναστάς έξηλθε φήσας, γελοΐον είναι, άνδράποδον μέν μή εύρισκόμενον, άξιουν ζητείν άρετην δ' ούτω έαν άπολωλέναι. Έρωτηθείς, πότερον γημαι η μή; έφη, "Ο αν αυτων ποιήσης, μεταγνώση. "Ελεγέ τε θαυμάζειν των τὰς λιθένους εἰκόνας κατασκευαζομένων, τοῦ μεν λίθου προνοείν, ώς δμοιότατος έσται αυτων δ' άμελεῖν, ώς μη όμοίους τῷ λίθφ φαίνεσθαι ήξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους συνεχῶς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, ϊν' εί μέν καλοὶ είεν, αξιοι γίγνοιντο εί δ' αίσχροὶ, παιδεία την δυςείδειαν ἐπικαλύπτοιεν. (34) Καλέσας ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πλουσίους, καὶ τῆς Ξανθίππης αίδουμένης, έφη, Θάβρει εί μεν γάρ είεν μέτριοι, συμπεριενεχθείεν ἄν εί δὲ φαῦλοι, ἡμῖν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν μελήσει. "Ελεγε, τοὺς μεν άλλους άνθρώπους ζην, ϊν' έσθίοιεν' αύτον δε εσθίειν, ϊνα Πρός το ούκ άξιόλογον πληθος έφασκεν, ομοιον εί τις τετράδραχμον εν άποδοκιμάζων, τον έκ των τοιούτων σωρόν ώς δόκιμον άποδέχοιτο. Αίσχίνου δὲ εἰπόντος, Πένης είμὶ καὶ άλλο μέν οὐδέν ἔχω, δίδωμι δέ σοι ἐμαυτόν. ᾿Αρ' οὖν, εἰπεν, οὐκ αίσθάνη τὰ μέγιστά μοι διδούς; Πρός τὸν ἀποδυσπετοῦντα ἐπὶ τῷ παρορᾶσθαι, ὁπότε ἐπανέστησαν οὶ τριάκοντα, Αρα, ἔφη, μή τι σοι μεταμέλει; (35) Πρός τον είποντα, θάνατον σου κατέγνωσαν 'Αθηναΐοι, Κάκείνων, φησίν, ή φύσις. Οι δε τοῦτ' 'Αναξαγόραν φασέν είπεῖν. Τῆς γυναικός είπούσης, 'Αδίκως ἀποθνήσκεις, Σὰ δὲ ἔφη, δικαίως ἐβούλου; "Οναρ δόξας τινὰ αὐτῷ λέγειν,

"Ηματί κεν τριτάτω Φθίην ερίβωλον ϊκοιο.

πρός Αἰσχίνην ἔφη, Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι. Μέλλοντί τε αὐτῷ τὸ κώνειον πίεσθαι, 'Απολλόδωρος ἰμάτιον ἐδίδου καλὸν, "ν' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐναποθάνη' καὶ δς, Τί δ', ἔφη, τὸ ἔμὸν ἰμάτιον ἐμ-βιῶναι μὲν ἐπιτήδειον, ἐναποθανεῖν δὲ οὐχί; Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Κακῶς ὁ δεῖνά σε λέγει' Καλῶς γὰρ, ἔφη, λέγειν οὐκ ἔμαθε. (36) Στρέψαντος 'Αντισθένους τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τοὐμφανὲς, 'Ορῶ σου, ἔφη, διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν κενοδοξίαν. Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Οὐ σοὶ λοιδορεῖται ὁ δεῖνα; Οὐχὶ, ἔφη' ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ πρόςεστι ταῦτα. Ελεγε δὲ τοῖς κωμικοῖς δεῖν ἐπίτηδες

ξαυτόν διδόναι. Εί μέν γάρ τι τῶν προσόντων λέξειαν, διορ-Θώσονται εί δ' οὐ, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

ΧVII. Πρός Ξανθίππην, πρότερον μὲν λοιδοροῦσαν, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ περιχέασαν αὐτῷ, Οὐκ ἔλεγον, εἰπεν, ὅτι Ξανθίππη βροντῶσα, καὶ ὕδωρ ποιήσει; Πρὸς ᾿Αλκιβιάδην εἰπόντα, οὐκ ἀνεκτὴ ἡ Ξανθίππη λοιδοροῦσα, ᾿Αλλ' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συνείθισμαι, καθαπερεὶ καὶ τροχηλέας ἀκούων συνεχές. Καὶ σὰ μὲν, εἰπε, χηνῶν βοώντων ἀνέχη. (37) Τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος, ᾿Αλλά μοι ὡὰ καὶ νεοττοὺς τίκτουσι Κάμοὶ, φησὶ, Ξανθίππη παιδία γεννῷ. Ποτὲ αὐτῆς ἐν ἀγορῷ καὶ Θοιμάτιον περιελομένης, συνεβούλευον οὶ γνώριμοι χερσὶν ἀμύνασθαι Νὴ Δι', εἰπεν, ἵν' ἡμῶν πυκτευ-όντων, ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγοι, εὖ Σώκρατες, εὖ Ξανθίππη. Ἔλεγε συνεῖναι τραχείᾳ γυυαικὶ, καθάπερ οἱ ἱππικοὶ θυμοειδέσιν ἵπποις. ᾿Αλλ' ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, φησὶ, τούτων κρατήσαντες, ῥαδίως τῶν ἄλλων περιγίνονται, οὕτω κάγὼ Ξανθίππη χρώμενος, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις συμπεριενεχθήσομαι.

XVIII. Ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ πράττων, πρὸς τῆς Πυθίας ἐμαρτυρήθη, Χαιρεφῶντι ἀνελούσης ἐκεῖνο δὴ τὸ περιφερόμενον,

'Ανδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

(38) 'Αφ' οὖ δή καὶ ἐφθονήθη μάλιστα. Καὶ δή καὶ ὅτι διήλεγχε τούς μεγαλοφρονοῦντας ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς, ὡς ἀνοήτους, καθάπερ Μέλιτον καὶ "Ανυτον" ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνός ἐστι Μένωνι. Οὖτος γάρ οὐ φέρων τὸν ὑπὸ Σωκράτους χλευασμὸν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπήλειψεν αὐτῷ τοὺς περὶ 'Αριστοφάνην' ἔπειτα καὶ Μέλιτον συνέπεισεν άπενέγκασθαι κατ' αὐτοῦ γραφήν άσεβείας καὶ τῶν νέων διαφθορᾶς. 'Απηνέγκατο μέν ουν την γραφην ὁ Μέλιτος' είπε δὲ την δίκην Πολύευκτος, ώς φησι Φαβωρίνος έν παντοδαπή ίστο-Συνέγραψε δὲ τὸν λόγον Πολυκράτης ὁ σοφιστής, ώς φησιν "Ερμιππος" η "Ανυτος, ως τινες. Προητοίμασε δὲ πάντα Λύκων ὁ δημαγωγός. (39) 'Αντισθένης δ' ἐν ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων διαδοχαῖς, καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἀπολογία, τρεῖς αὐτοῦ κατηγορῆσαί φασιν, "Ανυτον καὶ Λύκωνα καὶ Μέλιτον' τὸν μὲν "Ανυτον περὶ των δημιουργων καὶ των πολιτικων δργιζόμενον τον δὲ Λύκωνα, ύπερ των ρητόρων και τον Μέλιτον ύπερ των ποιητων οθς ἄπαντας ὁ Σωκράτης διέσυρε. Φαβωρίνος δέ φησιν έν τῷ πρώτψ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων, μη είναι ἀληθη τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυκράτους. Έν αὐτῷ γὰρ, φησὶ, μνημονεύει τῶν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ἃ γέγονεν ἐν ἔτεσιν ἔξ τῆς Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον.

ΧΙΧ (40.) Ἡ δ' ἀντωμοσία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον εἰχε τὸν τρόπον. ᾿Ανάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν (φησὶ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν τῷ Μητρῷψ). Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνθωμολογήσατο Μέλιτος Μελίτου Πιτθεὺς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου ᾿Αλωπεκῆθεν. ᾿Αδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὺς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰςηγούμενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. Τίμημα Θάνατος.

ΧΧ. Ὁ δ΄ αὐ φιλόσοφος, Αυσίου γράψαντος ἀπολογίαν αὐτῷ, διαγνοὺς, ἔφη, Καλὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος, ὧ Αυσία, οὐ μὴν ἀρμόττων ἐμοί. Δηλαδὴ γὰρ ἢν τὸ πλέον δικανικὸς, ἢ ἐμφιλόσοφος. (41) Εἰπόντος δὲ τοὺ Αυσίου, Πῶς, εἰ καλός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἄν σοι ἀρμόττοι; ἔφη, Οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἰμάτια καλὰ καὶ ὑποδήματα εἴη ἀν ἐμοὶ ἀνάρμοστα; Κρινομένου δ΄ αὐτοῦ, φησὶν Ἰοῦστος ὁ Τιβεριεὺς ἐν τῷ στέμματι, Πλάτωνα ἀναβῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Νεώτατος ῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀναβάντων τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐκβοῆσαι, Καταβάντων, τουτέστι κατάβηθι.

ΧΧΙ. "Οτ' οὖν κατεδικάσθη, διακοσίαις δγδοηκονταμιᾳ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν' καὶ τιμωμένων τῶν δικαστῶν, τί χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτίσαι; πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔφη δραχμὰς ἀποτίσειν. Εὐβουλίδης μὲν γάρ φησιν, ἑκατὸν ὁμολογῆσαι. (42) Θορυβησάντων δὲ τῶν δικαστῶν, "Ενεκα μὲν, εἶπε, τῶν ἐμοὶ διαπεπραγμένων τιμῶμαι τὴν δίκην τῆς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. Καὶ οἱ Θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν, προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα. Καὶ δεθεὶς, μετ' οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἔπιε τὸ κώνειον, πολλὰ καλὰ κάγαθά διαλεχθεὶς, ἃ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνί φησιν.

ΧΧΙΙ. 'Αλλά καὶ παιᾶνα κατά τινας ἐποίησεν, οὖ ἡ ἀρχή·

Δήλι' "Απολλον, χαῖρε, καὶ "Αρτεμι, παῖδε κλεεινώ.

Διονυσόδωρος δὲ φησι, μὴ είναι αὐτοῦ τὸν παιᾶνα. Ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μῦθον Αἰσώπειον, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιτετευγμένως, οὖ ἡ ἀρχή*

Αἴσωπος ποτ' ἔλεξε Κορίνθιον ἄστυ νέμουσι, Μὴ κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκω σοφίη. ΧΧΙΙΙ. (43) 'Ο μέν οὖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἢν. 'Αθηναῖοι δ' εὐθύς μετέγνωσαν, ὥστε κλεῖσαι καὶ παλαίστρας καὶ γυμνάσια. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐφυγάδευσαν Μελίτου δὲ βάνατον κατέγνωσαν. Σωκράτη δὲ χαλκῆς εἰκόνος ἐτιμήσαντο, ἢν ἔθεσαν ἐν τῷ πομπείῳ, Δυσίππου ταύτην ἐργασαμένου. "Ανυτόν τε ἐπιδημήσαντα αὐθημερὸν ἐξεκήρυξαν 'Ηρακλεῶται. Οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ Σωκράτους 'Αθηναῖοι πεπόνθασι τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστων ὅσων. Καὶ γὰρ "Ομηρον (καθά φησιν 'Ηρακλείδης) πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς, ὡς μαινόμενον, ἐτίμησαν καὶ Τυρταῖον παρακόπτειν ἔλεγον, καὶ 'Αστυδάμαντα πρῶτον τῶν περὶ Αἰσχύλον ἐτίμησαν εἰκόνι χαλκῷ. (44) Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ ὀνειδίζει αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ Παλαμήδει, λέγων,

'Εκάνετ' ἐκάνετε τὰν πάνσοφον Τὰν οὐδέν' ἀλγύνουσαν αἠδόνα μοῦσαν.

Καὶ τάδε μὲν ὧδε. Φιλόχωρος δὲ φησι, προτελευτῆσαι τὸν Εὐριπίδην τοῦ Σωκράτους. Ἐγεννήθη δὲ (καθά φησιν ᾿Απολλόδωρος ἐν τοῖς χρονικοῖς) ἐπὶ ᾿Αψεφίωνος, ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς ἑβδόμης Ὀλυμπιάδος, Θαργηλιῶνος ἕκτῳ, ὅτε καθάρουσι τὴν πόλιν ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν Ἅρτεμιν γενέσθαι Δήλιοί φασιν. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἐννενηκοστῆς πέμπτης Ὀλυμπιάδος, γεγονὼς ἐτῶν ἑβδομήκοντα. Καὶ ταῦτά φησι καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς. (45) Ἔνιοι γὰρ ἑξήκοντα ἑτῶν τελευτῆσαι αὐτόν φασιν.

ΧΧΙΝ. 'Αμφότεροι δὲ ἤκουσαν 'Αναξαγόρου, καὶ οὖτος καὶ Εὐριπίδης, δς καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς πέμπτης 'Ολυμπιάδος ἐγεννήθη ἐπὶ Καλλιάδου. Δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ὁ Σωκράτης διειλέχθαι. "Οπου γε καὶ περὶ προνοίας τινὰ διαλέγεται, καθά φησι καὶ Ἐενοφῶν, καὶ τοι περὶ μόνων τῶν ἠθικῶν ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους αὐτὸν εἰπών. 'Αλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ ἀπολογίᾳ μνησθεὶς 'Αναξαγόρου καὶ ἄλλων φυσικῶν, ὰ Σωκράτης ἀρνεῖται, περὶ τούτων αὐτὸς λέγει, καίπερ ἀνατιθεὶς πάντα Σωκράτει. Φησὶ δ' 'Αριστοτέλης, μάγον τινὰ ἐλθόντα ἐκ Συρίας εἰς 'Αθήνας, τὰ τε ἄλλα καταγνῶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βίαιον ἔσεσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτῷ. (46) "Εστι δὲ καὶ ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸν οὕτω.

Πινέ νυν εν Διός ων, ω Σώκρατες. Ή σε γάρ όντως Καὶ σοφόν είπε θεός, καὶ θεός ή σοφίη.

Πρός γάρ 'Αθηναίων κώνειον άπλῶς μὲν ἐδέξω, Αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξέπιον τοῦτο τεῷ στόματι.

ΧΧV. Τούτψ τὶς, καθά φησιν 'Αριστοτέλης ἐν τρίτψ περὶ ποιητικῆς, ἐφιλονείκει 'Αντιόλοχος Λήμνιος, καὶ 'Αντιφῶν ὁ τερατοσκόπος, ὡς Πυθαγόρα Κύδων καὶ 'Ονάτας' καὶ Σάγαρις 'Ομήρψ ζῶντι, ἀποθανόντι δὲ Ἐενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος' καὶ Κέρκωψ Ἡσιόδψ ζῶντι, τελευτήσαντι δὲ ὁ προειρημένος Εενοφάνης καὶ Πινδάρψ 'Αμφιμένης ὁ Κῷος' Θάλητι δὲ Φερεκύδης, καὶ Βίαντι Σάλαρος Πριηνεύς' Πιττακῷ 'Αντιμενίδας καὶ 'Αλκαῖος, 'Αναξαγόρα Σωσίβιος, καὶ Σιμωνίδη Τιμοκρέων.

ΧΧΥΙ. (47) Τῶν δὲ διαδεξαμένων αὐτὸν, τῶν λεγομένων Σωκρατικῶν, οἱ κορυφαιότατοι μὲν Πλάτων, Ξενοφῶν, 'Αντισθένης. Τῶν δὲ φερομένων δέκα οἱ διασημότατοι τέσσαρες, Αἰσχίνης, Φαίδων, Εὐκλείδης, 'Αρίστιππος. Λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφῶντος' εἶτα περὶ 'Αντισθένους ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς' ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἶθ' οὕτω περὶ Πλάτωνος' ἐπεὶ κατάρχει τῶν δέκα αἰρέσεων, καὶ τὴν πρώτην 'Ακαδημίαν αὐτὸς συνεστήσατο. 'Η μὲν οῦν ἀκολουθία τοῦτον ἐχέτω τὸν τρόπον.

XXVII. Γέγονε δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ἕτερος, ἱστορικὸς, περιήγησιν "Αργους γεγραφώς" καὶ ἄλλος, περιπατητικὸς, Βιθυνός
καὶ ἕτερος, ἐπιγραμμάτων ποιητής καὶ ὁ Κῷος, ἐπικλήσεις
Θεῶν γεγραφώς.

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riedrich Ernet Daniel. SCHLEIERMACHER

ON THE

WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

THAT very different and even entirely opposite judgements should be formed by different men, and according to the spirit of different times, on minds of a leading and peculiar order, and that it should be late, if ever, before opinions agree as to their worth, is a phenomenon of But it is less natural, indeed it everyday occurrence. seems almost surprising, that at any one time a judgement should be generally received with regard to any such mind, which is in glaring contradiction with itself. Yet, if I am not mistaken, it is actually the case with Socrates, that the portrait usually drawn of him, and the historical importance which is almost unanimously attributed to him, are at irreconcileable variance. Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the history of Greek philosophy; which at all events manifestly implies that he breathed a new spirit and character into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen, which we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they

assumed a new form under his hands, or at least that he materially widened their range. But if we enquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed, that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which

could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed, when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view. in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible after all to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favour of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflexion cannot fail to light upon of itself. What effect then can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement, that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and marketplaces, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature: still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the co-existence and intercommunion of both, and there is moreover no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates, in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were ex-

clusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out, that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to this Socrates; not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude, that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that, not the cynism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master, Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the mad Socrates, as he has been called, though in truth the highest epithet due to him is that of Socrates caricatured. For his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the self-contentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial wants, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going

about in the service of the god to expose the follies of mankind. But how foreign all this is to the domain of philosophy, and how little can be there effected with such means, is evident enough.

The only rational course then that seems to be left, is to give up one or other of these contradictory assump-Either let Socrates still stand at the head of the Athenian philosophy, but then let those who place him there undertake to establish a different notion of him from that which has been long prevalent: or let us retain the conception of the wise and amiable man, who was made not for the school but wholly for the world: but then let him be transferred from the history of philosophy to that of the general progress of society at Athens, if he can claim any place there. The latter of these expedients is not very far removed from that which has been adopted by Krug¹! For as in his system Socrates stands at the end of the one period, and not at the beginning of the next, he appears not as the germ of a new age, but as a product and aftergrowth of an earlier one; he sinks, as an insulated phenomenon, into the same rank with the sophists, and other late fruits of the period, and loses a great part of his philosophical importance. Only it is but a half measure that this author adopts, when he begins his new period with the immediate disciples of Socrates as such; for at its head he places the genuine Socratics, as they are commonly called, and above all Xenophon, men of whom he himself says, that their only merit was that of having propagated and

¹ Gesch. der Philos. alter Zeit.

diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period. - Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.* With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy, and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says, that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he cannot place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the sophists by his side, not indeed without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which however cannot by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato. For Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only

^{*} Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.

virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not in fact show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is after all the point at which according to him that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties. First as to his relation to Aristotle. that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as dirently opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's ! philosophy as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces So-

crates, even in works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though as a mere beginning it needs not to have been carried very far toward maturity. pause as this, however, we cannot avoid making: the earlier philosophy which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c. has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them, which could have formed a gradual transition: much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier, as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done, but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust, in denying his philosophical worth, and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him imaginary

offences against the commonwealth. But this would render it necessary to ascertain somewhat more distinctly, wherein his philosophical merit consists.

But this new inquiry naturally leads us back in the first instance to the old question, whether we are to believe Plato or Xenophon in their accounts of what Socrates was; a question, however, which only deserves to be proposed at all, so far as these two authors are really at variance with each other, and which therefore only admits of a rational answer, after it has been decided whether such a variance exists, and where it lies. Plato nowhere professes himself the historian of Socrates; with the exception perhaps of the Apology, and of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades in the Banquet. For it would certainly have been in bad taste, if here, where Plato is making contemporaries of Socrates speak of him in his presence, he had exhibited him in a manner that was not substantially faithful, though even here many of the details may have been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration. On the other hand, Plato himself does not warrant any one to consider all that he makes Socrates say in his dialogues, as his real thoughts and language; and it would be rendering him but a poor service to confine his merit to that of having given a correct and skilful report of the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he undoubtedly means his philosophy to be considered as his own, and not Socrates'. And accordingly every intelligent reader is probably convinced by his own reflections, that none but original thoughts can appear in such a

dress; whereas a work of mere narrative — and such these dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates — would necessarily show a fainter tone of colouring, such as Xenophon's conversations really present. But as on the one hand it would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and knew all that Plato makes him say: so on the other hand it would certainly be too little to say of him, that he was nothing more than the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in the Memorabilia, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place, a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strictly to this rule. We know, however, and this may be admitted without being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no philosopher, and that beside the purity of his character, and the good sense of his political principles, beside his admirable power of rousing the intellect, and checking presumption, which Xenophon loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed; which indeed he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to expose. the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator, and had no doubt selected this form for the very purpose, that his readers might not expect him to exhibit

Socrates entire, but only that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affections and of social life, and which bore upon the charges brought against him; every thing else he excludes, contenting himself with showing, that it cannot have been anything of so dangerous a tendency as was imputed to Socrates. And not only may Socrates, he must have been more, and there must have been more in the background of his speeches, than Xenophon represents. if the contemporaries of Socrates had heard nothing from him but such discourses, how would Plato have marred the effect of his works on his immediate public, which had not forgotten the character of Socrates, if the part which Socrates plays there stood in direct contradiction with the image which his real life left in the reader's mind? And if we believe Xenophon, and in this respect we cannot doubt the accuracy of the contemporary apologist, that Socrates spent the whole of his time in public places, and suppose that he was always engaged in discourses which, though they may have been more beautiful, varied, and dazzling, were still in substance the same with these, and moved in the same sphere to which the Memorabilia are confined: one is at a loss to understand, how it was that, in the course of so many years, Socrates did not clear the market-place, and the work-shops, the walks, and the wrestling-schools, by the dread of his presence, and how it is that, in Xenophon's native Flemish style of painting, the weariness of the interlocutors is not still more strongly expressed, than we here and there actually find

it. And still less should we be able to comprehend, why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed, that Socrates held discourses in public such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. as after such an experiment the greatest of poets would scarcely be able exactly to restore the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work: so it is in the other case with the philoso-One finds some parallels with Plato, phical basis. other fragments are detected in other ways: and the only inference to be drawn from the scarcity of these passages is, that Xenophon understood his business; unless we choose to say, that as Aristotle is supposed to have held his philosophical discourses in the forencon, and the exoteric in the afternoon (Gellius N. A. xx. 5), Socrates reversed this order, and in the morning held conversations in the market-place with the artisans, and others who were less familiar with him, which Xenophon found it easier to divest of their philosophical aspect: but that of an evening, in the walks, and wrestling-schools, he engaged in those subtler, deeper, and wittier dialogues with his favourites, which it was reserved for Plato to imitate, embellish, and expand, while he connected his own investigations with them.

And thus, to fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are still driven back to the Socrates of Plato, and the shortest way of releasing ourselves from the difficulty, would be to find a rule by which we could determine, what is the reflex, and the property, of Socrates in Plato, and what his own invention and addition. Only the problem is not to be solved by a process such as that adopted by Meiners, whose critical talent is of a kind to which this subject in general was not very well suited. For if in all that Plato has left we are to select only what is least speculative, least artificial, least poetical, and hence, for so we are taught, least enthusiastic, we shall indeed still retain much matter for this more refined and pregnant species of dialogues, to season Xenophon's

tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to discover any properly philosophical basis in the constitution of Socrates. For if we exclude all depth of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the grounds and methodical principles on which they depend, and which therefore Socrates can only have possessed instinctively, that is without the aid of philosophy. The only safe method seems to be, to inquire: What may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without however contradicting the strokes of character, and the practical maxims, which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates: and what must be have been, to give Plato a right, and an inducement, to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch of this question inevitably leads us back to the historical position from which we started; that Socrates must have had a strictly philosophical basis in his composition, so far as he is virtually recognized by Plato as the author of his philosophical life, and is therefore to be regarded as the first vital movement of Greek philosophy in its more advanced stage; and that he can only be entitled to this place by an element, which, though properly philosophical, was foreign to the preceding period. Here however we must for the present be content to say, that the property which is peculiar to the post-Socratic philosophy, beginning with Plato, and which henceforward is common to all the genuine Socratic schools, is the co-existence and inter-communion of the three branches of knowledge, dialectics, physics, ethics. This distinction separates the two periods very definitely. For before Socrates either these branches were kept entirely apart, or their subjects were blended together without due discrimination, and without any definite proportion: as for instance ethics and physics among the Pythagoreans, physics and dialectics among the Eleatics; the Ionians alone, though their tendency was wholly to physics, made occasional excursions, though quite at random, into the region both of dialectics and of ethics. But when some writers refuse Plato himself the honour of having distinguished and combined these sciences, and ascribe this step to Xenocrates, and think that even Aristotle abandoned it again; this in my opinion is grounded on a misunderstanding, which however it would here lead us too far to explain. Now it is true we cannot assert, that Socrates was the first who combined the characters of a physical, ethical, and dialectic philosopher in one person, especially as Plato and Xenophon agree in taking physics out of his range; nor can it be positively said that Socrates was at least the author of this distribution of Science, though its germ may certainly be found from the Memorabilia. But we may surely inquire whether this phenomenon has not some simpler and more internal cause, and whether this may not be found in Socrates. The following observation will, I conceive, be admitted without much dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate one province of knowledge from another, so long,

and in the same degree, does the whole course of their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances: for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predominant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connexion and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt, as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which car never again be lost; so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases it must be confessed, that the idea of science as such is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness, for science as such can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered. And this is unquestionably a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek philosophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science as such was not the governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness: and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business everywhere is to distinguish knowledge from opinion, hence the precision of scientific language, hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science; things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of being their starting-point, rather than that of knowledge.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance, what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this too is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of

his admirers. For if he went about in the service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was. For by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (ἀνεπιστημοσύνη), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and consequently must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought: the other, that all science forms one whole. For his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in a contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, cannot contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conceptions of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavour is indicated clearly enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato's Apology, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy. So that if we

conceive this to have been the central point in the character of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (Mem. IV. 6. 15.): that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted: we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hindrances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might show in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge; since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence too we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most of these conversations. For this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable, if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these con-That must have been quite a secondary versations. point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject,

it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form; and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But in order to show the imperfection of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists, and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain *method* was requisite. For it was often necessary in the course of the process to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to

the satisfaction of both parties; otherwise, all that was done would afterwards have looked like a paltry surprise; and the contradiction between the proposition in question, and one that was admitted, could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the Phædrus, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to first know how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialectics, which continued to be the soul of all the great edifices reared in later times by Greek philosophy, and by its decided prominence constitutes the chief distinction between the later period and the earlier; so that one cannot but commend the historical instinct which has assigned so high a station to him. At the same time this is not meant to deny, that Euclid and Plato carried this science, as well as the rest, farther toward maturity; but it is manifest that in its first principles, Socrates possessed it as a science, and practised it as an art, in a manner peculiar to himself. For the construction of all Socratic dialogues, as well of those doubtfully ascribed to Plato, and of those attributed with any degree of probability to other original disciples of Socrates, as of all those reported in the Memorabilia, hinges without any exception on this point. The same inference re-

sults from the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6. XIII. 4.): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates, is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since however it is an art, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and therefore no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was an art that required to be witnessed and practised in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learned from Socrates, as indeed is observed in Plato's dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head-What Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics,—he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resemble the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view therefore to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the meanwhile chose to tread closely in their master's steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different depart-

ments of knowledge, for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when after his death the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight? variations, it ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not indeed what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (Mem. I. 1.11.): that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavoured to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics, who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a sophist against Socrate

himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches: language, which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We cannot therefore conclude from this that


Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorised to suppose, that he fancied it possible to form ethics into a science by sufficiently multiplying those fragmentary investigations into which he was drawn in discussing the received opinions on the subject. The same law of progression was involuntarily retained in his school. For Plato, though he descends into all the sciences, still lays the principal stress on the establishment of principles, and expatiates in details only so far as they are necessary, and so much the less as he has to draw them from without: it is Aristotle who first revels in their multiplicity.

This appears to me as much as can be said with certainty of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher. should any one proceed to ask, how far he elaborated the idea of science in his lessons, or in what degree he promoted the discovery of real knowledge in any other province by his controversial discussions, and his dialectic assays, there would perhaps be little to say on this head, and least of all should I be able to extricate any thing to serve this purpose from the works of Plato taken by themselves. For there in all that belongs to Plato there is something of Socrates, and in all that belongs to Socrates something of Plato. Only if any one is desirous of describing doctrines peculiar to Socrates, let him not, as many do in histories of philosophy for the sake of at least filling up some space with Socrates, string together detached moral theses, which, as they arose out of occasional discussions, can never

make up a whole, and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates' philosophical speculations to principles. The first point therefore to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (Mem. I. 4. 8.), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (Euseb. Præp. XI. 3.), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the Parmenides.

But whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described cannot fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving, in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real, or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold, he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art, and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this

agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps indeed virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But on the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner, that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.



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
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